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INTRODUCTION
The taxation of labor income and the effects that it generates on microeconomic
decisions is a somewhat neglected area in tax research in Business Administration.
Wagner (2008, p. 107) cites evidence from the recent survey article by Hundsdoer-
fer, Kiesewetter and Sureth (2008) that supports this assertion: Only around 1% of
the literature cited there can be classified as true contributions to the taxation of
labor income.
This conclusion does not quite chime with the observation that labor income has
consistently provided the bulk of German income tax revenue. This fact, also em-
phasized in the introductions of contributions 2 and 3, is underscored by figure 1 on
the following page. It shows contributions to the tax base for the German income
tax in the year 2004, the latest fiscal year for which figures are available (Federal
Statistical Office, 2009, p. 605). In both panels, a distinction is made between the
tax base for the income type1 “Wage Income”, and the other six income types com-
bined. Along its y-axis, it additionally breaks down the overall income brackets that
taxpayers belonged to in the relevant year 2004. To the right of the bars represent-
ing “Wage Income” sits its percentage share in the respective income brackets. The
left panel concerns the number of taxpayers reporting labor / any other income –
where any taxpayer can of course have taxable income both in the non-wage and
wage category. The right panel shows the sum of reported positive income for both
categories.
1 Cf. figure 3.1 on page 64 for a disaggregated view onto the seven income types recognized under




























































































































































































































































































































































































































As is obvious from figure 1, the dominance of “Wage Income” is indisputable. It
seems to form the backbone of asset incomes for the middle class since its preva-
lence is most pronounced in the 20,000 to 75,000e range. It was this “inescapable”
picture which motivated my first foray into the realm of taxation of labor income in
my diploma thesis (Weiss, 2007).
There, I researched the effects caused by the differences in tax bases between capital Weiss (2007)
and labor income. Among the most salient results were the following:
• The massive body of human capital that modern economies rely on is indeed
“as good as gold” (Judd, 2000) for the individuals endowed with it: Rates of
return for an additional year of schooling between 7% and 10% were obtained
from the Mincer regressions (Mincer, 1974) whose results are assembled in
Weiss (2007, sect. B.3). To put these results into perspective, it must be borne
in mind that “later” interventions in the labor market, such as job creation
schemes, often measure their success in terms of a few percentage points
of increases in employment probability (Fitzenberger and Völter, 2007). At
the same time, these returns approach and even exceed those observed in
stock markets over long time horizons (DeLong and Magin, 2009) – with the
difference being that the vast majority of society is endowed with at least
some human capital while stocks are held by a comparatively small minority.
• From the point of view of taxation, I built on the contributions by Kaplow
(1996) and Wagner (2000) who showed that there was a substantial time ef-
fect favoring labor over capital income in an after tax perspective. In Weiss
(2007, sect. 3.5), I calculated the effective tax rates (ETR) that were im-
plied by the age-income-profiles I had derived. Depending on tax and interest
rates, these ETRs were substantially lower than the nominal tax rates facing
the worker, and in some cases well below zero. I then went on to ask how
the differences between capital and labor income could be reconciled, and ar-
rived at labor income tax rates substantially above prevailing capital income
tax rates (Weiss, 2007, sect. 3.6). Since the publication of Weiss (2007), the
introduction of a final withholding tax on capital income in Germany – fea-
turing a tax rate of 25% – has proved the practical feasibility – in a mature
democracy boasting one of the world‘s largest economies – of the theoretical
insights following from my contribution.
3
Introduction
In this doctoral thesis, I provide three contributions to the taxation of labor income.
They form a chain of events in the worker‘s life which are related to human capital
and encompass
• the initial impulse for human beings to be productive, i.e. a university educa-
tion early in life (contribution 1)
• the continuing training necessary to keep up with developments and maintain
productivity during the labor market participation (contribution 2)
• an example for the conditions under which the existing human capital stock
can be exploited, the tax treatment of commuting costs (contribution 3).
Contribution 4 represents an unrelated analysis of more well-established results of
capital income taxation.
One of the major insights gained while composing this doctoral thesis is the fact that
there is a well-established and comprehensive strand of literature on human capitalExtant Human
Capital Litera-
ture
issues in the economics profession, starting with the seminal contribution by Becker
(1964). This literature has already shed light on many aspects of human capital. A
recent contribution by Palacios-Huerta (2003a) begins thus:
Human capital resources are a crucial part of an individual’s capital
holdings and comprise much of the total aggregate wealth in the United
States and other economically advanced nations. During the last few
decades, much energy has been devoted to the analysis of human capital
and its empirical regularities. The result has been the accumulation of
a large amount of evidence supporting the importance of human capital
to the structure and evolution of earnings, occupations, employment
and unemployment, fertility, and economic growth and development.
In recent years, a tendency to apply well-rehearsed concepts borrowed from the
finance literature has become apparent:
• The famous Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) has
been enriched by the addition of human capital payoffs, yielding new insights,
as in Palacios-Huerta (2003b).
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• The equity return puzzle (DeLong and Magin, 2009) has found its counterpart
in the human capital return puzzle (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996; Judd,
2000; Palacios-Huerta, 2001).
• The fundamental schism between equity and debt financing at the firm level
has been taken up and adapted to the specific properties of human capital by
Jacobs and van Wijnbergen (2007), Vandenberghe and Debande (2008) and
Cigno and Luporini (2009).
• Capital mobility observed for financial markets also manifests itself on mar-
kets for human capital so that a strand of literature has developed researching
the tax burden on highly skilled – and hence mobile – labor (Elschner and
Schwager, 2007).
• Finally, the strands of finance and human capital literature have recently2 been
joined in Pantzalis and Park (2009).
I have aimed to add to the human capital literature in the following ways: Contribu- Contribution 1
tion 1, published as Weiss (2009), tries to blend the insights gained in Business Ad-
ministration – and comprehensively explained in my above cited book Weiss (2007)
– with the wider economic literature which arrived at strikingly similar conclusions
with different reasoning. The article by Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) is taken as the
basis of an investigation that is overdue, given that Dual Income Taxes are discussed
publicly in many countries (Genser and Reutter, 2007): How big a spread between
capital and labor income tax rates should be applied by legislators to account for
the fact that labor income is privileged under a traditional income tax? As it turns
out, the spread is quite substantial and much wider than most legislators allow for.
Reassuringly, the conclusions that I draw based on the article Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997) are strikingly similar to the ones arrived at in Weiss (2007).
To put the results into perspective, it should be borne in mind that the focus of con-
tribution 1 is substantially narrower than the one adopted in Weiss (2007). I restrict
my analysis to the student population, instead of a cross-section of society, and
trace their earnings history over time. A comparison with the group of workers who
could have gone to university, but chose not to, yields insights into the opportunity
costs of a university degree which consist mainly of forgone wages. At the same
2 Earlier contributions investigating the effect of the death of the CEO on firm value (Slovin and
Sushka, 1993) may be viewed as precursors to this development.
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time, in a refinement concerning my methodology, I employ the relatively rarely3
used Hausman-Taylor estimator (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The improvement
over the workhorse OLS estimator used in Weiss (2007) lies in the more advanced
treatment of the apparent endogeneity of schooling choices with an instrumental
variables strategy. The use of panel data – as opposed to cross-sectional data –
gives the estimates more stability.
Contribution 2 then traces the development of human capital further, by taking theContribution 2
education phase as finished and asking how an additional investment into human
capital in the form of training decisions is treated under tax law. Given the huge
body of literature dealing with training decisions (Leuven, 2005), the lack of con-
tributions on the tax influence is somewhat astonishing. I fill this gap by estimating
the return to training measures adopted in the period 2001 to 2003. My estimation
results find these measures to be highly profitable. On top of that, tax law favors
them in a similar manner as the – considerably larger – investments into human
capital that are the subject of contribution 1. For the much shorter durations over
which payoffs are received, the time effect does not assert itself as forcefully, but is
still appreciable.
While the first two contributions focus on the investment into human capital, contri-Contribution 3
bution 3 investigates the taxation of the commuting kilometers that taxpayers ply on
their way to work. Given that there is a human capital stock to exploit, taxpayers in
many cases need to appear physically in the workplace to allow the transformation
of their accumulated human capital stock into payoffs, and hence consumption, to
go ahead. This final step has been a political hot potato for a long time and has
consequently witnessed its fair share of volatility in recent years. This volatility is
harnessed in contribution 3 to extract behavioral reactions to different treatments of
the commuting kilometers.
The innovation provided by contribution 3 consists of the fact that it represents one
of the few attempts to dig into the rather intractable combination of tax base effects
and labor income. Also, the treatment evaluation literature (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005) has not been exploited as much as one might hope for in tax research in Ger-
many. A huge body of literature exists, for instance, harnessing the Tax Reform
3 The only recent application in the German context seems to be Schneider (2005).
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Act 1986 in the United States to gain insights into the tax influence on microeco-
nomic decisions (Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997; Kubik, 2004; Kumar, 2008). For
Germany, there are a few contributions that exploit policy changes with regard to
the corporation tax system in 2001, such as Edwards, Lang, Maydew and Shack-
elford (2004) and Blasch and Weichenrieder (2007). I provide an extension of these
efforts to labor income where the drop in the deductible amount for commuting
activities between the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 provides a natural experiment to
identify the tax influence on commuting behavior. As it turns out, Germans react
rather inelastically to these changes. Contribution 3 concludes the main part of this
doctoral thesis.
In contribution 4, published as Jacob, Niemann and Weiss (2008), Prof. Rainer Nie- Contribution 4
mann, my colleague Martin Jacob and myself subject the working paper by Bach,
Corneo and Steiner (2008) to a rigorous analysis. They claim that “the rich” do
not adequately contribute to income tax revenue in Germany, and provide proof
by employing a dataset merged from official tax statistics and the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). From this combined source, they derive an “effective
average income tax rate” of around 32% for the richest 0.0001% quantile of tax-
payers in Germany in the year 2002. Similar results are reported for other years and
quantiles.
We refute these claims by broadening the research question to all major tax burdens
weighing on the gross income generated by “the rich”. One of the more obvious
omissions is the local trade tax burden weighing on business income which “the
rich” largely rely on. This reliance is proved by publicly available data (Federal
Statistical Office, 2006, p. 13) which shows that over 96% of the taxpayers who
generated an overall sum of income in excess of 5,000,000 e in 2002 reported busi-
ness income. This income accounted for over 82% of their overall sum of income.
Other issues that biased the rates derived by Bach et al. (2008) include the use of
cross-sectional data that, by their very nature, are not capable of allowing inference
with regard to the treatment of tax losses or the role of accruals in the reported busi-
ness income. These intertemporal considerations can only be evaluated in a panel
context, but the necessary data collection efforts are still in their infancy. The tax
rates that we end up deriving in the contribution conclusively upend the notion that
“the rich” shirk their tax responsibilities. At the same time, we argue that the entire
setup chosen by Bach et al. is bound to fail and that the existing data cannot tell us
7
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much about the questions they sought to address.
Lastly, the datasets employed in this doctoral thesis should be mentioned briefly –Datasets
much more comprehensive descriptions can be found in section 1.2.2, section 2.3.3
and section 3.3.2 for the GSOEP, and section 4.3.1 for FAST 2001. The dearth
of datasets available to the tax research community is a major obstacle standing
in the way of more empirical research in this area. Compared to other subjects,
such as finance, which have very good and recent data sources at their disposal,
the demands placed by taxpayers on tax authorities in terms of confidentiality see
to it that access to official datasets carrying information pertaining to tax issues is
severely restricted.
The FAST dataset, compiled by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany and usedFAST 2001
in contribution 4, goes back all the way to the year 2001, when macroeconomic
conditions were considerably different, and, in particular, tax legislation was about
to undergo several influential transformations, such as a radical overhaul of the cor-
poration tax system or the introduction of a final withholding tax on capital income
later on. Furthermore, it is a cross-sectional dataset, and, as argued in contribu-
tion 4, this property severely constrains researchers in the kind of questions that
they can actively pursue. On a more positive note, the sample that researchers are
allowed to use in a remote location represents 10% of all tax returns filed for the
fiscal year 2001, which amounts to approximately 3,000,000 entries. For the pur-
poses of contribution 4, the full population of tax returns could be used, which is an
extremely rare occurrence in empirical research.
The GSOEP, on the other hand, provided by the DIW, Berlin, is a longitudinalGSOEP
study that covers a vast array of sociological subjects, with taxation being only one
of many. Some degree of vagueness is thus inevitable when making inference on tax
questions out of this dataset. However, the GSOEP makes up for these deficits with
its two major advantages: It is topical, i.e. last year‘s data are normally available the
next autumn, and it provides a true panel dataset, allowing the tax analyst to trace
subjects over several years, and thus to make inference much more robust (Baltagi,
2008, section 1.2). Indeed, contribution 1 makes considerable use of this property.
Quite apart from the ability to account for fixed effects over time, changes in behav-
ior can, by definition, only be observed in a panel context, and contribution 3 owes
its existence to this fact.
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CONTRIBUTION 1
HIGHER TAX RATES ON LABOR?
EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN PANEL
DATA
(Published as: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis 2009, pp. 73-92)
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Higher Tax Rates on Labor? Contribution 1
1.1 Introduction
The adoption of Dual Income Taxes in the Nordic countries during the 1990s and
more recent moves in this direction in other European countries have elicited a
sizeable number of academic contributions. Among them, the article by Nielsen
and Sørensen (1997) stands out as a comprehensive attempt to buttress the case for
the Dual Income Tax (DIT). The theoretical idea expounded in their contribution
states that the traditional taxation of labor income on the basis of cash-flows and the
taxation of returns from physical capital on an accrual basis may lead to distortions
in investment behavior which in turn harm economic efficiency. As a traditional
income tax lumps together these two streams of payoffs and applies a common
tax schedule to the resulting sum, the fundamental distinction between them – the
difference in the determination of their respective tax bases – is blurred. The DIT,
on the other hand, separates the two income types and typically applies a constant
marginal tax rate to capital income while labor income is taxed progressively.
This setup inevitably prompts one to investigate the “correct” spread between the
two tax rates. Empirically, this difference varies from country to country, as recently
shown in Genser and Reutter (2007, table 2), a part of which is reproduced in table
1.1 for convenience.
TABLE 1.1: Tax Rates in the Nordic Countries (in %)
Country Norway Finland Sweden Denmark
Implementation of DIT 1992 1993 1991 1987
Income Tax Rate for
Capital Income 28 28 30 28/43
Earned Income 28-40 26.5-50 31.6-56.6 38.8-47.9
Source: Genser and Reutter (2007), Table 2
Table 1.1 highlights the fact that the approach towards the relationship between
capital and labor ("Earned") income tax rates is nonuniform across the four Nordic
countries. While the Norwegian tax system lets "labor income taxation begin where
capital income taxation ends", the Finnish system sets the lowest labor income tax
rate below the rate for capital income while the Swedish legislator reverses this re-
lationship. With regard to the highest applicable marginal rate on labor income, the
degree of the spread between the rates for top earners differs widely as well. While
these observations are certainly incomplete in the sense that the determination of the
10
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respective tax bases exerts a strong influence on the effective tax burden weighing
on the economic activities of the taxpayer, they do show a rather surprising degree
of variation even though the Nordic countries are relatively homogeneous in other
economic aspects1.
In Germany, the introduction of a final withholding tax for capital income in the
year 2009, coupled with the continuing progressive taxation of labor income, can
be viewed as a step toward the Dual Income Tax in all but name. The German
capital income tax rate has been set at 25%, while labor income is taxed at marginal
rates ranging from 15% to 45%. German tax law also allows taxpayers to elect to
have their capital income taxed at their individual marginal tax rate if it is lower
than 25%.
The goal of this contribution is the investigation of the "correct" spread between
labor and capital income tax rates under a Dual Income Tax under the premises of
the Nielsen and Sørensen (1997)-Model. This agenda is thus fairly narrowly fo-
cused on an empirical investigation and does not seek to provide a new reasoning
for the results established by Nielsen and Sørensen (op. cit.). Nielsen and Sørensen
build an "overlapping generations model where consumers face a trade-off between
investment in human capital and investment in non-human capital" (p. 311, op.
cit.). Set in a small open economy, with perfect foresight and perfect competition,
the legislator has already committed himself to tax capital income at a constant
marginal rate and now has to determine the appropriate taxation of labor income2.
The "cash-flow treatment of human capital investment" is responsible for a distor-
tion under a conventional income tax that slaps equal marginal tax rates on labor
and capital income. Nielsen and Sørensen (op. cit.) argue that a justification for
differential tax treatment of labor and capital income lies in the fact that the social
and private after-tax rates of return coincide in the case of labor income while the
taxation of capital income drives the private rate of return below the social rate of re-
turn. As their equation (5) shows3, agents’ optimization behavior leads to the usual
prescription of equal marginal after-tax returns on human and non-human capital
investment, which in turn must equal the rate of time preference. As taxation does
1 Cf. Elschner and Schwager (2007) who classify the Scandinavian countries as uniformly high
tax with regard to labor taxation.
2 The Nielsen and Sørensen-Model thus conveys a “... typical second-best argument” (Nielsen and
Sørensen, 1997, p. 313) in that the commitment to tax capital income is taken as given. I thank
an anonymous referee for stressing this point.
3 Nielsen and Sørensen (1997, p. 317).
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not take a bite out of the return on human capital investment, overinvestment in hu-
man capital results and a surcharge is applied to the labor income tax rate above a
certain threshold to counteract this effect.
Applying this model to real world data necessitates adaptions that may be open to
criticism:
• Workers are not as homogeneous with regard to their ability to accumulate
human capital as the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model envisions. The human
capital production function g(E) (Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997, p. 316) should
be indexed gi(E), with i representing differently gifted brackets of society.
• The model is set in an OLG context, i.e. lives off the contrast between a young
and old generation. The dividing line in the data between these generations
is drawn at the time individuals enter the labor market after their formal ed-
ucation ends. In practice, the dividing line is blurred by the fact that lifelong
learning is commonplace so that a formal end to education cannot be reliably
determined4.
• Costs of education in the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model come exclusively as
opportunity costs during the education phase. Estimating these for differently
gifted workers is challenging. It requires the specification of a counterfactual
which constitutes another source of uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 1.2, I describe my dataset
and discuss the estimation strategy. The eight waves from 2000 to 2007 of the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel are employed to estimate a Mincer-type wage equation.
From the estimation results, the empirical age-earnings profiles for different educa-
tion brackets of the German population are deduced. In section 1.3, the necessary
surcharges to the labor income tax rate are computed under different constellations
of parameters for the simple tax system envisioned by Nielsen and Sørensen (1997).
Section 1.4 concludes.
4 In the Mincer earnings equation, labor market experience and its square as well as tenure account
for the effects of general and firm-specific human capital investments. I thank an anonymous
referee for alerting me to this point.
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1.2 Estimation of the Wage Equation
1.2.1 Estimation Strategy
I estimate a standard wage equation in a panel context based on the contribution by
Mincer (1974),






where i = 1, ..., N stands for individuals and t = 1, ..., T denotes time periods. Yit
stands for labor income while Bic represents cohort dummies for birth cohorts c,
Si stands for the (time-invariant) years of schooling, TEit denotes the tenure with
the current firm, EXit represents (actual) labor market experience, ui stands for a
unit-specific effect and εit represents the usual idiosyncratic shock. The matrix Wit
gathers further characteristics of the individuals, such as marital status, the blue-
collar/white-collar distinction, health status or workplace autonomy.
The literature on the returns to education – as embodied in the coefficient β1 in equa-
tion (1.1) – has evolved in several waves, with cross-sectional analyses employing
OLS estimators dominating the first one. As the return to education is likely to be
driven by unobservable characteristics of the individual, such as innate ability or
stamina, the schooling variable is not orthogonal to the error term and the exogene-
ity assumption underlying the OLS estimator is violated: the resulting estimates are
not even consistent. To account for this problem, the second wave of contributions
proposed instrumental variable (IV) strategies, as surveyed by Card (2001). These
strategies suffered from two major shortcomings, namely the lack of suitable in-
struments and the weak correlation of the existing instruments with the endogenous
regressors (cf. Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 1999).
The existence of suitable panel data allows one to get around the problem. Fixed
effects (FE) regressions allow correlation between the regressors and the individual
effect ui, eliminating the bias inherent in OLS estimations of the wage equation, but
cannot provide point estimates of time-invariant factors (such as length of schooling
once an individual leaves school). Random effects (RE) models deliver such esti-
mates, yet assume that the covariates are uncorrelated with the individual effects ui
and the idiosyncratic shocks εit. The polar cases of FE and RE estimation entail
13
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drawbacks in terms of estimation output or in terms of almost untenable assump-
tions, with the choice between them often hinging on the Hausman specification
test (Hausman, 1978).
The “all-or-nothing decision” (Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte, 2003, p. 361) implied
by an adoption of the FE or RE estimator was enriched by a third alternative formu-
lated in Hausman and Taylor (1981). Hausman and Taylor developed the Efficient
Generalized Instrumental Variables (EGIV) estimator which allows one to control
for the correlation between individual effects and the regressors and at the same






iα + ηit (1.2)
where xit denotes the matrix of time-varying covariates and zi the matrix of time-
invariant regressors, these matrices are split, with the part x′1it containing the ex-
ogenous, time-varying regressors, x′2it the endogenous, time-varying regressors, z
′
1i
the exogenous, time-invariant regressors, z′2i the endogenous, time-invariant regres-
sors. The error term ηit is decomposed into an individual-specific part ui and an









2iα2 + ui + εit (1.3)
with the components of the error term independently and identically distributed
(0, σ2u) and (0, σ
2
ε), respectively, and their conditional variance
V ar (εit + ui|xit, zi) = σ2ε + σ2u = σ2η .
The further technical implementation is extensively described in Greene (2008,
chap. 12.8). Crucially, in a situation where the analyst suspects correlation be-
tween covariates and the individual effects ui, the HT estimator relieves the analyst
of the duty to find external instruments6. Instead, it constructs instruments from
within the model, as it employs the time varying exogenous variables gathered in
x′1it “... twice, once as averages and another time as deviations from these averages”
(Baltagi, 2008, p. 134).
5 The contribution Hausman and Taylor (1981) explicitly concerns the estimation of a wage equa-
tion based on panel data.
6 Note that a suspected correlation with the idiosyncratic part of the error term εit would call for
external instruments.
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The quality of the instruments thus obtained must be subjected to the usual test of
overidentifying restrictions as the above mentioned problem of weak correlation
can bite here as well. A common approach in the literature employs the statis-
tic developed by Sargan (1958) to prove the legitimacy of the instruments, as in,
for instance, Baltagi (2008, p. 135) and Kalwij (2000, p. 66). The Sargan test
statistic is distributed χ2 under the null, with degrees of freedom – in the case of
the Hausman-Taylor estimator – equal to the difference between the number of
time-varying exogenous covariates (x′1it in equation (1.3)) and the number of time-
invariant endogenous covariates (z′2i)
7.
1.2.2 Dataset
The dataset comes8 from the last eight waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel,
conducted by the DIW, Berlin9. The estimation period ranges from 2000 to 2007.
I restrict my estimation to German male dependent workers aged 18 to 65 years.
To abstract from unemployment, I further restrict the estimation sample to workers
who worked full time and have no missing data during the entire estimation period.
This yields 1,629 valid observations for each of the eight years. The prevailing
cohort strengths can be gauged from table 1.2.
The dependent variable log(Yit) in equation (1.1) is the (natural) logarithm of gross
labor earnings in the respective year t, unadjusted for inflation, which was excep-
tionally low during the estimation period in Germany, averaging about 1.6%. I
include Christmas bonuses, holiday and performance pay in the calculation of gross
compensation.
The covariates are
• Education time Si which is calculated according to the standard durations
for German school degrees, as contained in table 1.3: A high school degree
holder with a completed university degree would thus be credited with 18
7 As a corollary, the test can be calculated only in the overidentified case.
8 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov
2007) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu).
The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins
are available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-
DeNew and Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
9 For comprehensive information on the GSOEP, cf. Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005).
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TABLE 1.2: Cohort Strengths in the Dataset
Birth Cohort No. Percent Cumul. Percent
1940-1944 59 3.62 3.62
1945-1949 136 8.35 11.97
1950-1954 233 14.30 26.27
1955-1959 301 18.48 44.75
1960-1964 323 19.83 64.58
1965-1969 299 18.35 82.93
1970-1974 176 10.80 93.74
1975-1979 96 5.89 99.63
1980-1984 6 0.37 100.00
Total 1,629 100
Source: German Male Full-Time Workers, drawn from the GSOEP 2000-2007
years of education, 13 for his high school degree and five for completing
university10.
• Actual labor market experienceEXit is obtained from the GSOEP data which
explicitly deliver the lengths of employment and unemployment spells.
• Tenure with the current employer, as reported in the GSOEP data, and the
CNEF One Digit Industry Code11.
• A set of cohort dummies, bundling five cohorts each. To avoid collinearity
problems, the cohort 1940 to 1944 is omitted from the estimation.
• Dummy variables denoting marital status, bad health, blue-collar work, and a
dummy for public servants.
I allocate these covariates into the vectors employed in equation (1.3) as follows:
• Tenure, actual labor market experience and its square enter as time varying
endogenous variables gathered in x′2it
• Cohort dummies and the public service dummy enter as time-invariant ex-
ogenous variables (z′1i)
10 These standard durations are supplied by the data provider, the DIW in Berlin (Haisken-DeNew
and Frick, 2005, p. 69).
11 Cf. Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 72).
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TABLE 1.3: Conversion of Degrees into Imputed Educational Times Si (in Years)
Schooling Si
No Degree - 7
Lower School Degree Hauptschule 9
Intermediary School Realschule 10
Degree For A Professional College Fachhochschulreife 12
High School Degree Hochschulreife 13
Additional Occupational Training Si
Apprenticeship Lehre 1.5
University Degree Universität 5
Degree names are additionally given in German for ease of interpretation.
Source: Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 69)
• The schooling duration Si enters as a time-invariant endogenous variable (z′2i)
The remaining covariates are collected in x′1it. I discuss this choice in conjunction
with my results below.
1.2.3 Estimation Results
Table 1.4 gives the results of the Hausman-Taylor estimation of equation (1.1). The
return to schooling is estimated at 10.50% per additional year of education, with a
95% confidence interval for this coefficient ranging from 7.56% to 13.44%.
These results can be compared against recent findings for German panel data. Boock-
mann and Steiner (2006) conduct a random effects estimation and put particular
emphasis on cohort effects, thus addressing a set of questions different from the
ones tackled in this paper12. Their dataset consists of GSOEP data from 1984 to
1997, and a digest of their findings translated into rates of return can be found in
Boockmann and Steiner (2006, p. 1150). At least the finding of a return for German
men with a university degree of 9.77% is roughly in line with the results in this
paper. In terms of the tenure variable, the insignificance found in Boockmann and
Steiner is also present in table 1.4, as well as the magnitude of the coefficients for
labor market experience and its square.
12 I did experiment with the cohort effects estimated by Boockmann and Steiner (2006), and found
no significant influence. A joint Wald test of interaction terms between the education variables
and the eight cohort dummies came in at 12.02 against a critical value at the 95% confidence level
of χ28 = 15.507.
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TABLE 1.4: Estimation Results for Equation (1.1)
Hausman-Taylor Estimator
Bad Health -0.0069 (0.0040)∗
Blue-Collar Worker -0.0221 (0.0095)∗∗
Marital Status -0.0118 (0.0050)∗∗
CNEF Industry Code -0.0023 (0.0027)
Experience 0.0365 (0.0026)∗∗∗
Experience Squared -0.0006 (0.0001)∗∗∗
Tenure 0.0015 (0.0010)
Cohort 1945-1949 0.0746 (0.1729)
Cohort 1950-1954 0.1109 (0.1670)
Cohort 1955-1959 0.1800 (0.1627)
Cohort 1960-1964 0.3695 (0.1673)∗∗
Cohort 1965-1969 0.4102 (0.1633)∗∗∗
Cohort 1970-1974 0.4826 (0.1629)∗∗∗
Cohort 1975-1979 0.5384 (0.1709)∗∗∗
Cohort 1980-1984 0.5346 (0.2593)∗∗
Civil Service 0.0339 (0.0457)






Sargan Critical Value 7.815
Sargan χ2 2.503
Sargan p-Value 0.475
Analytic standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Omitted Category: Cohort 1940-1944
Marital Status coded 1 for “married”,
0 for “not married”
ρ denotes the fraction of the estimated
residual variance attributable to σ2u
Source: German Male Full-Time Workers,
drawn from the GSOEP 2000-2007
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Examples of the adoption of the Hausman-Taylor approach for other countries are
provided in Kalwij (2000) who employs panel data to measure the return to school-
ing in the Netherlands in the 1980s while García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez
(2005) utilize the European Community Household Panel to estimate returns to ed-
ucation in Spain and Portugal in the 1990s. The significant differences between the
OLS and EGIV results are presented in Table 2 of Kalwij (2000) and Tables 3 and
4 of García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez (2005) where the return to schooling
increases from an OLS estimate of 6.9% and 2.4% to an EGIV estimate of 14.8%
and 9.5%, respectively. An earlier study by Baltagi and Khanti-Akom (1990) which
compared several variants of the Hausman-Taylor estimator with FE results using
the “Panel Study of Income Dynamics” and was conducted using data featuring a
comparable time dimension (1976-1982), yielded a range of coefficients for the ed-
ucation variable of 13.72% – 14.18%, depending on whether the original Hausman-
Taylor estimator or the later enhancement by Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) or the
one by Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989) was used. Thus, the point estimate pre-
sented in this paper finds itself within reach of the results established by comparable
estimation strategies.
With regard to the precision of the estimates, the standard error of the coefficient
for the schooling variable is remarkably low in comparison to, for instance, the
ones reported in Hausman and Taylor (1981, p. 1392) or Baltagi and Khanti-Akom
(1990, p. 404). The results reported in the latter contribution result in a confidence
interval from 9.63% to 17.94%. The radical data selection strategy described in
section 1.2.2 certainly plays a major role here: Abstracting from unemployment,
which was particularly high during the estimation period, makes for low standard
errors in the estimation output. On the other hand, the groups germane to the further
discussion in section 1.3, i.e. university graduates and high school degree holders,
tend to have lower than average unemployment rates.
Concerning the validity of the estimation strategy, a first check is a Hausman test
of the within estimator of equation (1.1) against the random effects estimator which
returned a test statistic of 48.93 which is distributed χ27 under the null, with the
critical value for the 95% confidence level at 14.067. The test rejects the additional
orthogonality assumptions made by the RE estimator, i.e. the lack of correlation
between the regressors and the individual effects, and suggests the application of an
IV strategy such as the Hausman-Taylor estimator.
With regard to instrument quality for the purposes of this estimator, the Sargan
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statistic13 is reported at the bottom of table 1.4. The test statistic comes in at 2.503,
far below the critical value of χ23 = 7.814. The null cannot be rejected which
supports the case for the chosen IV strategy.
Other classifications into exogenous and endogenous variables, i.e. movements be-
tween x′it and z
′
i in equation (1.2), as conducted, for instance, in Baltagi and Khanti-
Akom (1990, pp. 402-404), brought about worse results: The removal of labor
market experience, its square and tenure from the set of endogenous variables, for
instance, led to a Sargan statistic of 19.137, with the critical value14 at χ26 = 12.592.
Other tentative moves between the classifications for the covariates did not improve
on the constellation reported in table 1.4, either.
1.3 Results
As the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model "postulates that the opportunity cost of educa-
tion and training consists solely of foregone labor income" (Nielsen and Sørensen,
1997, p. 322), the calculation of rates of return on human capital investments re-
quires the determination of opportunity costs, i.e. labor income earned without
attending a certain educational program. To this end, I select the group of uni-
versity graduates in the sample and define the earnings increment attributable to
their university degree as the excess return over the group of high school degree
holders who chose not to attend university. Setting the counterfactual in this fash-
ion, I pit two relatively homogeneous groups against each other to minimize the
selection bias that manifests itself in the choice of a university education: More
able students are more likely to attend university than their less able peers. I ex-
perimented with treatment evaluation models in the spirit of Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, chap. 25) and found that they rejected the notion of systematic differences
between the two groups15. Furthermore, this setup enables a clear-cut vision of the
kind of “... trade-off between accumulation of financial capital and accumulation
of human capital...” (Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997, p. 314) envisioned in the Nielsen
13 All estimation results are obtained from Stata 10.1. The overidentification test was conducted in
the package xtoverid (Schaffer and Stillman, 2006).
14 The removal of time-varying covariates from the vector of endogenous regressors adds them to
the exogenous ones and thus leads to the increase in degrees of freedom for the Sargan statistic.
15 Collins and Davies (2004) follow a cruder approach to calculate rates of return for the Canadian
education system during the 1990s: They compare the earnings of university graduates to the
median earnings of high school graduates.
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and Sørensen-Model because the university degree is a particularly well-defined
and important educational program.
On the other hand, the particular results derived on the back of this setup are pri-
marily relevant to the comparison at hand, i.e. between high school and university
graduates. If the comparison was conducted between two other groups, the outcome
would certainly be different: The required spread is contingent on the comparison
undertaken. Yet the thrust of the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model, the requirement for
higher tax rates on labor income from an efficiency standpoint, can be confirmed.
At the same time, the elusiveness of a definitive result for the required surcharge
becomes apparent. On top of that, the result hinges on assumptions about long-term
interest rates and several parameters of the Nielsen and Sørensen tax system, as
well. I carry out the relevant sensitivity analyses below16.
I predict the conditional mean of the earnings in year t from the receipt of the final
educational degree onwards on the basis of my results in table 1.4 as
Et = exp
(














where a hat stands for the point estimates from table 1.4, Et denotes the mean
of the earnings distribution, conditional on the covariates, and I assume that the
error term in equation (1.1) is approximately normally distributed17. I omit the
tenure variable from the calculations due to insignificance. To illustrate the result,
figure 1.1 plots the conditional means of the earnings for university and high school
graduates against age, up to the assumed retirement age of 65 years, for the birth
cohort 1965 - 1969.
Subsequently, I calculate the public/social rate of return for a university education













where the LHS represents the present value of foregone earnings of the individ-
uals choosing a university education, i.e. the earnings of a worker with a high
16 See table 1.5.
17 A Shapiro-Wilk normality test on the errors from the regression in table 1.4 did not reject the null
of normal distribution (p=0.176).
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FIGURE 1.1: Prediction of Mean Gross Earnings for University and High School
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school degree EHSt , and the RHS stands for the earnings increments of the uni-
versity graduates over their peers, calculated over the remaining 41 years of their
labor market participation. Equation (1.5) is designed to mimic the calculation of
the public/social rate of return to human capital investment that lies at the heart of
the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model.
To derive the private rate of return, I introduce the simple tax system of Nielsen
and Sørensen (1997, p. 316), with a marginal tax rate t1 applicable to labor income
below a threshold Ω, and a rate τ for capital income. I constrain the lower labor
income tax rate and the capital income tax rate to be equal, t1 = τ , in accordance
with Nielsen and Sørensen (1997)18. A rate t2 > t1 kicks in for labor income above
Ω. In the comparison of university graduates and high school degree holders, Ω is
initially set equal to 25,000 e. I vary this rate below to check for the sensitivity to
this assumption. The private rate of return r∗pr is then computed as the solution to
18 Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) show in a technical appendix that their result holds even in the
absence of this condition.
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The first row of equation (1.6) shows the after-tax opportunity costs for a university
student: The wages obtainable in the labor market for a high school graduate are cut
by the lower rate t1 as long as they remain below Ω = 25, 000 e, while above that
level the more onerous tax rate t2 bites. The second row shows the after-tax values
of the earnings of the university graduate. In the third row, the after-tax earnings
of the high school graduate are subtracted to arrive at the excess earnings for the
university graduate from the receipt of his degree to retirement.
Under the tax system described above, the private rate of return to investment in
financial assets equals i×(1− τ), where i denotes the prevailing gross interest rate.
The idea at the core of Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) is that, given the (distortionary)
taxation of capital income, this rate must coincide with the private rate of return on
human capital investment r∗pr to avoid distortions in investment behavior. To this
end, the rate t2 in equation (1.6) is raised until r∗pr hits i× (1− τ).
For the calculations, I continue the example above and compute r∗pu and r
∗
pr accord-
ing to equation (1.5) and equation (1.6), respectively. The tax rate t1 = τ is set
at 25%. Assuming a gross interest rate of 6%, the goal is to lower the private rate
of return on human capital to 6% × (1− 25%) = 4.5%. I iteratively raise t2 in
equation (1.6) until r∗pr hits this value. This procedure yields a t2 of 73.71%. Subse-
quently, one can derive the average tax rate on the labor income ta of the university












Figure 1.2 shows the development of the required average tax rates on labor income
under the assumptions made above. To align the private return to his human capital
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investment, the average tax rate for the university degree holder must unambigu-
ously exceed the – assumed – tax rate of 25% for financial capital. The tax rate
is age dependent because marginal labor income above the – immovable – thresh-
old of Ω = 25, 000 e is subject to the higher tax rate t2. Increased earnings thus
drive up the weighted average rate in equation (1.7). The required tax rates end up
mirroring the development of the gross earnings in figure 1.1.
FIGURE 1.2: Required Average Tax Rates for a University Graduate under a
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To check for the sensitivity of the result with regard to the structure of the tax
system, I vary the threshold Ω in the following and report the resulting t2 rate that
aligns the private rates of return on human and financial capital investment. To this
end, consider the situation depicted in figure 1.3, where Ω is set equal to 26,000 e.
In the left part of the graph – areas I and II –, the after-tax opportunity costs of a
university degree, the after-tax wages obtainable between the age of 19 and 24, are
depicted. In the after-tax perspective, the bulk of those costs is cut by the low tax
rate t1 (area I), raising their net burden, while only the small fraction in area II is
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cut by t2. In the right part of the graph – areas III and IV –, both EUt and E
HS
t
exhaust the maximum allowance for t1. Their relative position is thus unchanged,
and t2 equals 73.22%. Raising the threshold to 28,000e, the fraction of lower taxed
opportunity costs in area I rises, while the situation in areas III and IV remains
unchanged. More burdensome opportunity costs translate into a lower private rate
of return which must be pushed up by a milder t2, inducing a drop from 73.22%
to 72.69%. A further hike in Ω to 30,000 e increases the net opportunity costs to
their maximum, as now EHSt remains below the threshold in areas I and II and t2
is lowered to 72.44%. From this point onwards, a rising threshold does not impact
opportunity costs anymore, but merely subjects an ever larger part of the difference
EUt −EHSt to the lower tax rate t1, raising the private rate of return. At Ω =35,000e,
for instance, t2 must be raised to 74.83% to counteract this effect.
It is now straightforward to predict the behavior of the system for a changing t1.
A higher marginal rate for low incomes, at low thresholds Ω, will tend to lower
25
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opportunity costs and leave the benefits of education unchanged, altogether driving
up the private rate of return and triggering a higher t2. At higher thresholds, a
marginal increase in t1 reduces both opportunity costs and benefits. The latter are
discounted more heavily in equation (1.5), and their impact outweighs that of the
benefits. In the same vein, a higher interest rate i would raise the required return
on human capital investment r∗pr, which calls for a lower tax rate t2. Table 1.5
summarizes the behavior of t2 just described for discreet changes in the exogenous
parameters.
TABLE 1.5: Required Marginal Tax Rates t2 under the Nielsen and Sørensen-
Model, for Varying Interest Rates i, Tax Rates t1 and Thresholds
Ω
i 4%
t1 = τ 10% 20% 30% 40%
Ω 10,000 87.30% 89.63% 91.90% 93.69%
20,000 77.83% 81.79% 85.50% 88.69%
30,000 72.65% 77.72% 82.42% 85.75%
40,000 83.30% 86.92% 89.65% 92.52%
i 6%
t1 = τ 10% 20% 30% 40%
Ω 10,000 79.84% 84.78% 88.53% 91.48%
20,000 67.66% 74.17% 80.20% 85.50%
30,000 61.71% 69.69% 75.78% 81.77%
40,000 72.20% 78.96% 84.14% 88.72%
i 8%
t1 = τ 10% 20% 30% 40%
Ω 10,000 69.38% 77.08% 83.68% 88.56%
20,000 53.61% 64.50% 73.39% 80.70%
30,000 47.23% 59.10% 69.13% 76.59%
40,000 57.27% 68.76% 76.82% 83.84%
Source: Own Calculations
1.4 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to estimate the extent of the required divergence between
the tax rates on capital and labor income emanating from the model of Nielsen and
Sørensen (1997). To this end, a Mincer-type earnings equation was estimated for a
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panel of German workers in the years 2000 to 2007, employing the EGIV estima-
tor proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). This approach takes into account the
correlation between the regressors and the individual effects, entailing substantial
advantages over competing IV-approaches which suffer from lack of suitable instru-
ments. The Hausman and Taylor approach also trumps the competing fixed effects
model in that it explicitly enables the user to estimate the impact of time-invariant
endogenous covariates – such as schooling. It thus appears ideally suited for the
task at hand.
The estimate of a return of 10.50% for every year of schooling finds itself within
the range of results established in the literature, both in a national and international
comparison. It is utilized to predict the conditional mean of the wages of differently
educated brackets of German workers. Among the available groups, the relatively
homogeneous one of High School Graduates is selected to emulate the setup of
the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model. The marginal costs and benefits of a university
graduation translate into a private rate of return which would equal the public rate of
return if a proportional tax rate was applied. The taxation of the return to financial
capital assumed in the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model necessitates measures to lower
the private rate of return to human capital investments to the level of the competing
financial investment. To this end, a surcharge is added to the labor tax rate above
a certain threshold to bring the private rate of return on human capital investments
into line with the private rate of return on financial capital. A special, yet relatively
frequent educational biography – that of a university graduate – thus proxies for the
stylized world spawned by the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model. Although the results
cannot be readily generalized to the overall population, they do yield clues as to the
extent of the necessary correction envisioned by Nielsen and Sørensen.
The extent of the surcharge for the case of university graduates is substantial, de-
pending on the design of the tax system, i.e. the boundary between the higher and
the lower labor income bracket, the tax rate for the lower labor income bracket and
the interest rate. For realistic cases, i.e. a kink in the marginal tax rates at the thresh-
old of 20,000 e19, a lower marginal rate of 25% and a gross interest rate of 6%, the
19 Checking back with the original Nielsen and Sørensen-Model, the threshold Ω is supposed to dis-
tinguish between "...’low’ income from (unskilled) labor..." and earnings above that for "...skilled
workers..." (Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997, p. 316). Taking a cue from table 1.3 and table 1.4, the
unskilled can be represented by the "No Degree" group (credited with 7 years of schooling) who
earn their keep primarily from manual labor. Their labor earnings are predicted between 13,000
e and 25,000 e so that a threshold of 20,000 e seems sensible.
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necessary average tax rates range between 48% and 66% and thus by far exceed
those applicable under German tax law which stipulates a top marginal income tax
rate of 45% for labor income in excess of 250.000 e.
Importantly, this contribution has been written under the assumptions of the basic
Nielsen and Sørensen-Model, in particular the assumption of an exogenous choice
of leisure. Nielsen and Sørensen explore the case of an endogenous labor/leisure
decision in their section 8, and find ambiguous results. Yet under plausible assump-
tions, the case for a surcharge to the tax rate on higher labor income remains intact.
Stepping out from the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model, it is important to realize that
their model, and its empirical implementation above, is exclusively focused on time
effects in the relationship between labor and capital income taxation. Quite apart
from higher marginal tax rates, the effect of social security and pension contri-
butions impacts labor’s effective tax burden. Some of these contributions can be
classified as taxes, e.g. on the basis of their actuarial unfairness, and the analy-
sis presented here is thus complementary to a recent contribution by Elschner and
Schwager (2007) who examine effective tax rates on the labor income of highly
qualified employees, a group that certainly overlaps with the university graduates
analyzed here.
Furthermore, tax base effects, such as the deductibility of commuting costs, exert a
huge influence on the tax burden weighing on labor. Recent moves by the German
legislator in this area have seen deductions for these costs abolished for the first
twenty kilometers of the journey to the workplace. A judgement by the German
Constitutional Court subsequently restored them. The episode shows that for the
group of taxpayers who fully or partly exhaust the allowance for commuting costs,
the legislator tried to use a tax base effect to increase income tax receipts. Higher tax
rates are a more universal tool for the same purpose, though, as they hit taxpayers
regardless of their distance to the workplace.
In conclusion, it appears that the Nielsen and Sørensen-Model should be subjected
to further empirical examination in future research. In particular, additional insights
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2.1 Introduction
The importance of labor income for the consumption streams of most households is
well documented, as their asset portfolios are heavily tilted toward human capital:
Roughly 65% of Germany‘s national income has consistently been distributed as
wages over time (Federal Statistical Office, 2008b, p. 621). This preponderance
is also reflected in the overwhelming share of the income type “Employment” in
taxable income in Germany over the last two decades, as reported in Müller (2004,
p. 77): While income from employment, as recognized by § 19 of the German
Income Tax Code, made up close to 80% of the tax base of the German income
tax in 1989, this proportion had risen to over 85% in 1995. In 2004, its share still
hovered around 81% (Federal Statistical Office, 2008a, table 1).
The labor market rewards workers for being productive. One major contribution to
labor‘s productivity – which, in turn, is one of the major determinants of economic
growth (Cohen and Soto, 2007) – is given by mandatory schooling, which house-
holds engage in during their youth. While these activities are confined to the phase
before entering the labor market, technological change, which brings about obsoles-
cence of acquired knowledge, and depreciation, i.e. forgetting, usually force agents
to refresh and expand their knowledge and thus to engage in further education activ-
ities during their labor market participation. These activities are commonly called
“training decisions” in the literature (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2004). Apart from
securing continued labor market attractiveness, training decisions can also be taken
to increase earnings over and above the current level. Evidence of the profitabil-
ity of these training investments for both workers and firms is abundant: Almeida
and Carneiro (2009, p. 98), for instance, report an estimate for the rate of return
of 8.6%, which approaches the long-term return on equities (DeLong and Magin,
2009).
These training activities exhibit all the hallmarks of investment decisions: Con-
sumption possibilities are forgone today in order to obtain more consumption to-
morrow, adjusted for some rate of time preference. Training decisions fit seamlessly
into this fundamental framework. In fact, the literature has aptly described them as
just another "...vehicle for carrying consumption into the future..." (Rosen, 1982,
p. 443). There is abundant empirical evidence that highlights the dimensions of
the resulting activities. For Germany, they can be gauged from Federal Statistical
Office (2008b, p. 153): As figure 2.1 on the facing page shows, over 6.8 million
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courses were taken in Germany in 2007. The incidence of occupational training
peaks between the age of 40 and 45.
FIGURE 2.1: Incidence of Occupational Training by Age Group and Gender





















Source: Federal Statistical Office (2008), page 153
Data for Germany, 2007
An interesting angle onto training decisions is provided by the famous Mincer equa-
tion (Mincer, 1974) that relates the conditional expected (logarithmic) wage to years
of schooling and the length of (potential) labor market participation and its square.
Why does the labor market accord higher earnings to more experienced workers?
The derivation of the Mincer equation, as shown in Franz (2009, p. 93), explic-
itly incorporates the assumption that a fraction of the worker’s time and thus of
his potential contemporaneous output is devoted to investment into his human cap-
ital. This fraction is assumed to be 100% during the formal schooling period and
to decline linearly afterwards to hit 0% at the age of (planned) retirement. Hence,
returns estimated in empirical research employing the Mincer equation constitute a
hash of returns to schooling and returns to some kind of further training assumed
to be undertaken, although this fact is seldom articulated in the vast literature on
the Mincer equation. Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003, p. 3) support this argumentation
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when they remark that "...postschool human capital investments are proxied ... by
work experience or, in other words, left as a black box".
There is a vast strand of literature estimating rates of return to training, with re-
cent contributions for Germany by Muehler, Beckman and Schauenberg (2007) and
Kuckulenz (2007). From the point of view of taxation, though, there is a remarkable
dearth of publications on the tax consequences of training measures - which is rather
surprising given that the early contribution by Rosen (1982) had already established
an influence of income taxation on training decisions. The scarcity of research in
this area is also underscored by the lack of publications cited in the survey article
Hundsdoerfer et al. (2008) and the lament in Sørensen (2004, p. 28).
Comprehensive recent German contributions to the topic, such as Kuckulenz and
Maier (2006) and the longish article Lechner and Wunsch (2009), do not mention
taxes. Hungerbühler (2007) and Tremblay (2009) constitute fairly recent theoreti-
cal contributions that do attempt treatments of these subjects. Empirical evidence
regarding the interrelation between taxation on the one hand and returns to training
on the other hand is still lacking, though, and is provided in this paper.
Since labor taxation does not recognize the notion of an “asset”, but is conducted
along the lines of cash-flows flowing to the employee (Kaplow, 1996; Nielsen and
Sørensen, 1997), there is a parallel to an active and closely related strand of liter-
ature that evaluates the accounting and tax consequences of investment decisions
that are immediately expensed under current tax accounting rules, dubbed “inter-
nally developed intangible assets” in the seminal contribution Robinson and Sans-
ing (2008). For instance, the fact that accounting rules explicitly provide for im-
mediate expensing of research and development (R&D) expenditures has been re-
searched with regard to the influence on share prices by Chan, Lakonishok and
Sougiannis (2001), and with regard to earnings management in Osma and Young
(2009). The connection to human capital issues has become more apparent in the
recent contribution Pantzalis and Park (2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We review the tax effects in play and
describe the relevant provisions of the German Tax Code in the evaluation period
2000 to 2003 in section 2.2. Section 2.3.1 specifies the research goal while sec-
tion 2.3.2 introduces the necessary econometric methods. Section 2.3.3 describes
the dataset, section 2.3.4 provides the estimation results, and the tax implications
following from the estimation results are presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 con-
cludes. Appendix 2.5 provides additional methodological details.
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2.2 Training Decisions under an Income Tax
2.2.1 Tax Effects for Training Decisions
The customary distinction between tax base-, time- and tax rate effects (Hundsdoer-
fer et al., 2008) can be harnessed for the training investments considered here:
• Tax base effects, in the form of the deductibility of training costs: § 4 (5)
of the German Income Tax Code does curtail deductibility for certain expen-
ditures or provides lump-sum deductions. Training costs are, however, not
constrained in their deductibility1.
• Time effects, which manifest themselves in the full deductibility of the initial
cost of the investment and the full taxability of the wages flowing back to the
employee.
We provide a standard treatment of time effects in training decisions here. Let the
tax treatment of human capital payoffs be marked by full deductibility of pecuniary
costs and the full taxability of payoffs. Further assume that investments in human
capital are evaluated in a two-period framework. This is a view of the world typical
of the overlapping generations literature where the two periods are often interpreted
as "youth" and "working age", as in Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) or Jacobs and
Bovenberg (2009). Then the after tax rate of return2 rτ is related to the pre tax rate
of return r as follows:
rτ =
− (1− τ)C + (1− τ) (1 + r)C
(1− τ)C
= r (2.1)
withC denoting pecuniary costs and τ describing a time-invariant tax rate. As equa-
tion (2.1) shows, full deductibility and full taxability cause pre and post tax rates
of return to coincide. Alternatively, the legislator could exempt "normal" returns
r from taxable income entirely. Both payouts and payoffs would be irrelevant for
taxable income then. Equation (2.1) highlights the effects of a cash-flow tax.
Yet while acquisition costs for human capital are fully tax deductible in many coun-
tries and the wages flowing back to workers are taxed in their entirety, this fact
1 Fuest and Huber (2001) model this tax base effect theoretically.
2 In a two period framework, none of the drawbacks of the internal rate of return bite so that an
evaluation of investment with rates of return is permissible here.
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in itself does not establish a cash-flow tax, as might be surmised following equa-
tion (2.1). The important point to grasp is that investment decisions are taken in a
relative world. A whole set of investment possibilities with differing rates of returns
constantly competes for investors’ attention, and none of them is "desirable" or "un-
desirable" in itself. Indeed, investment theory is imbued by the notion of relative
advantage, as expressed most succinctly by net present value calculations.
The standard alternative investment in the form of a savings account is usually not
accorded the treatment set out in equation (2.1). Indeed, payments into the saving
account are not tax deductible and only the return from the account is subject to tax.
With human capital investments and the savings account going head to head in the
investor’s mind, the relation between them is unlikely to remain stable in an after-
tax comparison. No matter whether a calculation before tax yields an advantage for
human capital or the savings account, the order between them can be distorted by
taxation.
This point was made in Kaplow (1996) and later applied in Weiss (2007) who dis-
cussed the tax treatment of human capital payoffs in relation to those for physical
capital for differently educated German workers over their entire lifetime. The main
result was the finding that, for reasonable constellations of average tax and interest
rates, a major tax advantage in favor of human capital exists – a conclusion which is
also supported in elaborate economic models such as Nielsen and Sørensen (1997).
One of the open questions is caused by the concept of economic income (Wenger,
1999) which forms the basis of this strand of literature. It concerns the treatment
of economic rents accruing to workers: When should the rent first be taxed, i.e. the
first appreciation be turned into taxable income (Diller and Grottke, 2010, section
3.2)? Birth itself endows most human beings with considerable earnings potential
that can be transformed into wages through manual labor, without requiring much
in terms of education. Thus, the question does arise how tax law should treat the
resulting windfall. The present paper does not grapple with this issue as economic
rents for training decisions can only accrue through a conscious decision by the
worker or the firm, so that the time of the payout for the training measure taken can
be regarded as a natural starting point for taxation.
Translating the above into a handy formula, the relative advantage of an investment
into human capital compared to the savings account can be expressed succinctly in
net present value terms as
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where Wt stands for the wage rate and t is a time index. The obvious after-tax




− (1− τl)Ct + (1− τl)Wt





(1 + i (1− τc))t
(2.3)
where τl denotes the labor income tax rate, τc describes the capital income tax rate,
and a full-blown traditional income tax represents the obvious special case τl = τc.
A simple example may serve to clarify the full meaning of equation (2.2) and equa-
tion (2.3). Assume an investor facing a perfect capital market with the interest rate
at 5%, and tax rates τ = τl = τc. Let the costs for a training course at t = 0 be
1,000 monetary units and his payoff in t = 1 be 1,050 monetary units. Elementary
computations show that the investor is indifferent before tax between investing in
human capital and depositing the 1,000 in his savings account, facing a marginal
investment opportunity.
Figure 2.2 on the next page shows the effect of taxation on the net present value.
With a 0% tax rate obviously representing the no-tax case, the NPV must start off
from 0. It rises to a peak of 12.20 at a tax rate of 50.6%, dropping back to 0 for a
tax rate of 100% .
As the NPV after tax constantly hovers above the pre-tax NPV, tax law hands an
unambiguous advantage to the human capital investment. The difference between
the NPVs is represented by the NPV after tax. Transforming it,
NPVτ = −1, 000 (1− τ) +
1, 050 (1− τ)
1 + 0.05 (1− τ)
= (1− τ) 1, 000
(
1.05
1 + 0.05 (1− τ)
− 1
) (2.4)
Equation (2.4) shows that the curvature in figure 2.2 on the next page can be traced
back to two countervailing forces:
1. The first part of equation (2.4) gives the effective payout for the investor; as
his payout of 1,000 is tax deductible, he merely pays (1 − τ)1, 000 for the
right to the gross cashflow of 1,050 in t = 1.
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FIGURE 2.2: Impact of Taxation on the Net Present Value, Interest Rate 5%
2. On this effective payout of (1 − τ)1, 000, the investor earns a tax-induced
"excess return" that is made up of the return to his human capital – untouched
by taxation as in equation (2.1) – in relation to the return from his savings
account which is cut by taxation.
Raising the tax rate τ causes the effective payout to decline and the tax induced
excess return to rise. The phenomenon of an NPV rising with the tax rate has been
described as the tax paradox in the literature before. The difference in equation (2.4)
is easily identified as that between actual and economic depreciation charges, scaled
by the tax rate τ . In the particular case of equation (2.4), the actual depreciation




1, 000− 1, 000




1 + 0.05 (1− τ)
which allows one to calculate the top of the divergence in figure 2.2 as
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= 0⇔ τ ∗ ≈ 50.6% (2.5)
As it turns out, the unequal treatment of the two competing investments causes
them to diverge after tax. In this particular example of a marginal investment, the
investor’s indifference before tax is turned into an incentive to take the course after
tax.
Lowering the return to 3% and leaving the market interest rate untouched at 5%,
the investment should not be undertaken, as the pre-tax NPV stands at -19.05. Yet
under taxation, figure 2.3 shows that the picture changes. The part of the panel
to the left of 40% is a "comfort zone" where no tax-induced change in investment
behavior is observed. To the right of 40%, the NPV switches sign, leading to a
"danger zone" of tax-induced distortions.
FIGURE 2.3: Impact of Taxation on the Net Present Value, Interest Rate 3%
In a more formal treatment, let the return on the investment in human capital r
diverge from the market interest rate i, implying possibly profitable investments in
human capital, and allow for a divergence of the tax rates τl and τc. Sticking to the
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(1 + r) (1− τl)C
1 + i (1− τc)
− (1− τl)C (2.7)
so that the difference between the NPVs and thus the tax induced distortion between
human capital investment and the standard alternative becomes
∆NPV = NPVτ −NPV
=
(
(1 + r) (1− τl)C












r − i (1− τc)
1 + i (1− τc)





As equation (2.8) makes clear, the difference between before and after-tax NPV is
a rather complex expression while under a pure cash-flow tax the difference should
be as easy as
∆NPV = NPVτ −NPV = (1− τ)NPV −NPV




Reassuringly, equation (2.8) collapses to equation (2.9) by setting τc to zero.
From an economywide perspective, a harmful situation arises once the order of in-
vestment projects is distorted by taxation. If taxation induces changes in economic
behavior, it imposes excess burdens that add to the economic costs of the tax sys-
tems. A non-neutral tax system may harm the economy in two respects:
1. It induces agents to expend planning costs that a neutral tax system avoids.
If the ranking after tax can differ from the one established before tax, it may
prove worthwhile for the investor to incur planning costs.
2. It may suggest unattractive investment options to an investor. Once tax plan-
ning has been carried out, a project that should have been discarded on the
basis of the pre-tax NPV can reassert itself as attractive after tax. While this
choice is rational from the investor‘s perspective, it is harmful to the overall
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economy.
The analogies between physical and human capital are blurred by the following
considerations, though: In a perfect capital market, it is customarily assumed that
any project with a positive NPV is implemented, if necessary by borrowing the ini-
tial costs. This assumption is unlikely to be tenable for human capital investment.
While in the case of physical capital investment, investments can be extended al-
most limitlessly, a human being is constrained by the time available to it and the
attention spans it can devote to any one task. To put it differently, if two training
opportunities should open up, both promising huge returns exceeding those from al-
ternatives, the individual may only be able to take up one of them and thus “waste”
value. This “waste”, though, is forced upon him by his natural constraints.
This leads to the insight that a mere transfer of customary principles from physical
to human capital may prove elusive. It also ties in with the conjectures in Almeida
and Carneiro (2009, p. 98) on the question why training measures are not extended
even further than the level observed in figure 2.1 on page 31. In particular, the
persistence of economic rents from human capital investments may be explained
with the above mentioned arguments. Apart from this attention restriction, there is
a talent restriction because the natural distribution of abilities cannot be overcome.
A second line of argumentation rests on the fact that payoffs from human capital
investments are highly correlated with the overall wealth of the worker: An accident
that leaves the worker unable to work (and thus to utilize his human capital in the
labor market) also entails significant costs for his health care, i.e. human capital
does not pay off in states of the world when payoffs are most needed. This positive
correlation calls for a higher required rate of return and goes some way to explaining
the “human capital premium puzzle” (Christiansen, Joensen and Nielsen, 2007).
2.2.2 Relevant Provisions of the German Income Tax Code 2003
To evaluate the influence of taxes on the training decisions made by German work-
ers, the relevant provisions of the German Income Tax Code for the period 2001
to 2003 are presented here. The determination of the tax liability in the German
Income Tax Code is mostly governed by its first four sections, comprising §§ 1 to
34. While section two governs the tax base, section four contains the tax rate rules.
The determination of taxable income proceeds in several distinct steps, enumerated
in the "Income Tax Guidelines" (Einkommensteuerrichtlinien), number 3. German
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Income Tax law recognizes seven income types, detailed in § 2 (1), among them the
“Income from employment” that we focus on in this contribution. “Income” in the
case of “employment” is calculated according to §§ 8 and 9 of the income tax code,
with the latter stipulating the deductibility of training costs from the gross wages
received in a certain year.
The income from the seven income types is determined according to the provisions
of the second section of the code. It is added up to arrive at the sum of income
(Summe der Einkünfte). Importantly, in the years 2001 to 2003 interest income
counted towards the sum of income and was subject to the normal tax schedule. But
for minor items, the sum of income equals the overall amount of income (Gesamt-
betrag der Einkünfte). The next step involves the deduction of special items, such as
special allowances (Sonderausgaben) and extraordinary burdens (außergewöhnliche
Belastungen) born by the taxpayer in the relevant year. After these deductions, the
income is determined, which, reduced by deductions for children, equals the taxable
income.
For the case of special allowances, § 10 of the German Income Tax Code 2003 left
the taxpayer with an option to itemize deductions or to go for a lump-sum deduction.
Itemized deductions include those for contributions to health-, unemployment- and
accident insurance or the church tax payed. While it would be difficult and in many
cases arbitrary to try to calculate the itemized deductions, the lump-sum option,
detailed in § 10c, can easily be inferred from the wages received by the individual.
Having calculated and deducted this special allowance, the taxable income thus
calculated is then processed by the piecewise function that made up the German
Income Tax Rate function for the year 20033. During the years under observation
in this paper, namely from 2001 to 2003, these tax rates remained in force during
the entire period. The tax rate function consisted of four zones, with the first zone
featuring average and marginal tax rates constant at 0%. After the first kink at a
taxable income of 7,236 e, taxpayers faced an initial marginal tax rate of 19.9%,
which rose to a top marginal rate of 48.5% for incomes above 55,008 e.
3 § 32a (2003) stipulates minor complications like rounding the taxable income to the nearest num-
ber dividable by 36, and increasing it by 18, whose inclusion would not add to the insights desired
in this paper.
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2.3 Empirical Returns to Training
2.3.1 Research Goal
Within the microeconometrics literature, the quantities data analysts usually want to
extract when evaluating treatment effects are the average treatment effect (ATE), the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the local average treatment effect
(LATE) (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In the absence of a truly experimental
dataset, i.e. one where treatment has been assigned based on a random mechanism,
the impact of a treatment is difficult to disentangle from the selection mechanism
that caused subjects to take part in the first place. We expand this insight below in
section 2.3.2.
For the purposes of this contribution, the desired quantity is the ATT, i.e. the effect
that the treatment had on the participants. Note that interest here rests in the attribu-
tion of an economic rent to the payout for the training measure, while much of the
training evaluation literature (Fitzenberger and Völter, 2007) is intended to answer
the question whether a certain program “made sense”, i.e. improved post-treatment
outcomes in terms of the probability of employment.
Defining the treatment as T and the outcome variable as Y , the interesting parameter
is
ATT = E (Y1|T = 1)− E (Y0|T = 1) (2.10)
where Y0,1 denote the outcome for untreated and treated cases and E (•) denotes
the expectation operator. (2.10) thus says that the ATT denotes the difference in
outcomes for the cases that chose to be treated. As usual, only one of the two
outcomes is observed, the counterfactual is not.
If the only difference between E (Y1|T = 1) and E (Y0|T = 1) was the treatment
assignment, one could estimate the population version of (2.10) from the sample
moments for treated and untreated cases. Yet the non-random assignment of T
frustrates this strategy, as outcomes would have been different even in the absence
of treatment, i.e. iff
E (Y0|T = 1)− E (Y0|T = 0) 6= 0 (2.11)
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2.3.2 Econometric Specification
As argued above, the econometric specification employed to determine the rent ob-
tained by training participants must account for the fact that the outcome of the
training intervention is observed only for those individuals that take part in the
training exercise. The possible outcome of training for an individual who – given
the opportunity to participate – chose not to be treated – the counterfactual – can
never be observed. If individuals randomly self-selected into training, the easiest
and most obvious modeling strategy, including a dummy variable indicating treat-
ment (=participation in training in 2001-2003) and non-treatment, would be justi-
fied. Yet the estimated treatment effect as embodied in the OLS coefficient of the
dummy would be unlikely to be an unbiased estimator of the true impact. It is well
known that individuals will self-select into treatment or non-treatment on the basis
of the perceived benefits and costs that participation will entail. Only when this
assessment leads to a positive expectation, i.e. the expectation of an economic rent,
will agents participate in the treatment. Those who voluntarily submit to the treat-
ment are likely to be endowed with more innate abilities to start with so that high
propensity to engage in training will be correlated with the wage outcome.
The dataset does not contain information concerning the abilities of individuals.
The correlation thus induced between the treatment dummy and the error term leads
to a failure of the fundamental OLS assumption that the covariates are (condition-
ally) independent from the error term (Greene, 2008, table 2.1). Econometric meth-
ods are thus called for to circumvent the problem. The microeconometric literature
has coined the term “treatment evaluation” for this kind of estimation problem.
Cameron and Trivedi (2005, ch. 25) and Greene (2008, ch. 24.5) describe the
parametric models applicable in this context.
The decision to engage in training activities can be observed from the available data,
yet the calculus behind it cannot. From the above, one can surmise that potential
candidates for participation in training activities will form an expectation about the
economic rent obtainable from the program. The rent constitutes a latent variable.
Denoting this rent by R, participation is conditional on R exceeding zero, where R
is impacted by z, a set of covariates. Thus the participation equation for the ith
individual models his participation pi as
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pi =
1 if R > 00 if R 6 0 (2.12)
Letting the perceived benefit R depend on covariates z and an error term u
R = zγ + u (2.13)
equation (2.12) turns into
pi =
1 if zγ + u > 00 if zγ + u 6 0 (2.14)
The outcome equation then models the resulting wage as
wi = xβ + δpi + ε (2.15)
where x stands for covariates in the outcome equation, and β denotes the associated
parameter vector, while δ is the (scalar) parameter for the participation dummy.
The errors of the participation and outcome equation are distributed according to









The interesting output from equation (2.15) is the difference between (conditional)
expected earnings for the treated and untreated groups which is given by Greene
(2008, p. 890): The wage expectation of the trained (pi = 1), conditional on co-
variates xi and zi, is






is the inverse Mills ratio and φ and Φ denote the density and distribution function
of the standard normal, respectively. The counterpart for the untrained (pi = 0) to
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equation (2.17) is then






The expectation of the difference in wages between trained and untrained workers
is then given by
E [wi| pi = 1, xi, zi]− E [wi| pi = 0, xi, zi]







= δ + ρσε
[
φ (zγ)
(1− Φ (zγ)) Φ (zγ)
] (2.20)
This shows that a naive application of OLS techniques would wrongly attribute the
second part of equation (2.20) to the coefficient for δ while in reality it is down to




as in equation (2.16). OLS
estimates for the dummy are thus biased upwards if ρ > 0 is assumed.
The correlation coefficient in the joint error distribution ρ thus assumes critical im-
portance. Setting ρ = 0, the second part of equation (2.20) drops out and the OLS
estimator is back in business. The assessment of the merits of a special treatment
regression and its simpler OLS counterpart thus critically hinges on the confidence
interval for ρ emerging from the estimation.
As for the estimation of the model specified in equation (2.14) and equation (2.15),
Maddala (1983, pp. 117-122) shows the derivation of the modeling strategy. Both
maximum likelihood and twostep estimation are possible here. Under full informa-
tion maximum likelihood, which is used exclusively in this paper, the necessary
joint (log-)likelihood function of the random variables specified by equation (2.14)


































if pi = 0
(2.21)
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Estimation of β̂ and γ̂ – where a hat denotes estimated parameters – in equa-
tion (2.21) proceeds by maximizing the log-likelihood with respect to these param-
eters iteratively. The properties of maximum likelihood estimates are conveniently
assembled in Greene (2008, p. 487). Recent applications of the method employed
in this paper include Jackson, Liu and Cecchini (2009), who research the interac-
tion between capital expenditure decisions and the depreciation method chosen, and
have to account for the apparent endogeneity of this choice on the firm level, and
Kim, Chung and Firth (2003).
2.3.3 The Dataset
Description of the Dataset
The holy grail for the analyses conducted in this contribution would be a panel
dataset that lets the data analyst trace the employment and training history, along-
side wage data, sociological indicators and detailed information on the tax status of
both the individual and the spouse. The dataset employed in Dearden, Reed and van
Reenen (2006) – for the British case – constitutes a rare example where these de-
mands are to some extent met. For Germany, the data availability is rather limited,
so that compromises are inevitable.
The dataset4 employed for the estimation is a subsample from the 2000 and 2004
waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), compiled by the DIW, Berlin5. The
survey is comprehensively described in Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). A topi-
cal module "Further Education, Training, Labor Market" was included in the GSOEP
questionnaires in the years 1989, 1993, 2000 and 2004. The additional questions
asked in this module pertain to the training efforts that respondents have undertaken
in the previous three years, the kind of financial assistance that they could avail
themselves of, the motivation for participation in a course and the self-assessed re-
sults (Muehler et al., 2007). The subsample of the data used in this paper was drawn
in the following fashion:
4 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov 2007)
for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The
PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the GSOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins
are available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-
DeNew and Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
5 The data used in this publication were made available to me by the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (GSOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
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We obtained information from the 2000 and 2004 waves of the GSOEP on a large
number of socio-economic variables and initially restricted the sample to all adult
respondents who provided information in both 2000 and 2004. Subsequently, we
divided the sample into an estimation sample and an auxiliary sample. The estima-
tion sample served to estimate the regressions in section 2.3.4 while the auxiliary
sample provided information necessary for the calculation of the marginal tax rates
for spouses. Inclusion in the estimation sample was determined as follows:
• The estimation sample was restricted to German workers who reported posi-
tive gross labor income in both 2000 and 2004.
• As the emphasis is placed on training decisions (which require future em-
ployment to pay off), the sample was confined to workers below the age of
61 and above the age of 19.
• The sample was limited to dependent full and part-time workers, thus drop-
ping the self-employed whose inclusion would be unlikely to contribute to
the question at hand.
As the final outcome variable of interest, we define a variable “Gross labor income
in the year 2004”. The GSOEP provides detailed information on the monthly gross
labor income and the number of months during which the respondent drew this
salary. The following components are added into the measure of gross yearly com-
pensation:
• Any 13th or 14th month pay.
• Christmas and vacation bonuses.
• Other bonuses reported in the GSOEP6.
The dataset was enriched by the addition of a variable on taxable income. In the
case of a single household, the sum of income equals the sum of the seven income
types mentioned in section 2.2.2. Of these seven, the income types reported in a
more or less precise fashion in the dataset are the following:
1. Income from employment
6 While the definition of this variable is a little hazy, it only averages about 93 e over the sample
and is thus not quantitatively important.
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2. Income from self-employment, which is of minor importance.
3. Income from capital, which lumps together interest and dividends. As a rough
approximation, the ratio of interest to dividend income is assumed to be 4:17.
4. Income from rent and lease.
Thus, only four income types can be ascertained from the data. Yet, having re-
stricted the cases to dependent workers, the loss of information is minor. At the
very least, one may hope that the deficiencies of the dataset balance out so that the
taxable income derived can at least serve as an unbiased estimator of the real taxable
income.
As the self-employed were eliminated from the dataset, most persons had little in-
come apart from income from employment. For married couples, though, the com-
plication arose that the marginal tax rate depends on the sum of income of both
spouses. Fortunately, these income streams can be matched according to a unique
partner number in the GSOEP. From the sum of income of the spouses, a marginal
tax rate applicable to both of them can be inferred.
Descriptive Statistics
After the necessary deletions enumerated in section 2.3.3, the sample size dropped
to 8,749, 2,994 of whom belong to the estimation sample and 5,755 do not. As
of 2000, the median age is 39 and the mean age is 39.37. Within the estimation
sample, 1,915 respondents did not take a single course in 2001 to 2003 while the
remaining 1,079 did - figures that are comparable to those reported in Muehler et al.
(2007).
Figure 2.4 on the next page provides the first evidence that training measures do
indeed impact wages. It shows the pre- and postintervention wages, i.e. in 2000 and
2004, for participants and non-participants in the estimation sample. On the one
hand, there are marked differences between the two groups before the intervention
even took place, i.e. in the year 2000. Indeed, the difference in their mean wages
was 880e, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) ranging from 829.28e to 931.14e.
After the intervention, in 2004, the difference amounts to 954.38e, with a 95% CI
from 890.62e to 1018.15e. Note that these are the “crude” differences emerging
7 This is important for the 2004 wave, as dividends were taxed according to the half-income prin-
ciple while interest was subject to income tax in its entirety.
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from a descriptive analysis of the estimation sample, and that so far, no correction
for the endogeneity of selection into training has been applied. Macroeconomic
developments, though, such as the overall state of the labor market, are constant as
the difference between the two groups is modeled in section 2.4.3 below.
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The GSOEP asks respondents for information on the last three courses they at-
tended8. With regard to the particular circumstances of these courses and the costs
borne by respondents, this paper focuses on the most recent course. For one,
this course is fresh in respondents’ memories, lowering the infamous misreport-
ing which can seriously harm the validity of econometric results. Furthermore, the
after-tax calculus described in section 2.4.2 will feature the tax provisions in force
during the years 2001 to 2003. It is most likely that the most recent course was
taken with these provisions in mind, while for earlier courses, the decision to par-
ticipate might have been made prior to 2001. This difference matters because the
8 The original questionnaire is accessible at www.diw.de, with the relevant questions on pages
26-28.
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tax rate structure in force in 2000 stipulated a top marginal tax rate of 51% instead
of 48.5% in the years 2001-2003, for instance.
The goals pursued by respondents in taking courses in 2001-2003 were also queried
for the GSOEP, and by far the most important one is the “adjustment to new de-
mands in the job”. This result must be viewed against the background of the restric-
tion of the dataset to the working male population which suggest that "retraining"
and introduction to a new job should not feature high on the priority list. As for the
costs of the most recent course, the mean of the distribution amounts to 841.45e,
on a standard deviation of 1,449.66.
2.3.4 Estimation Results
The treatment regression of section 2.3.2 is run to estimate (2.20). To this end, we
introduce
• As joint covariates shared between the selection equation (2.14) and outcome
equation (2.15):
– The time span spent at the current firm by the training participant (tenure)
– Marital status
– Length of education which proxies for the highest school degree ob-
tained
– Age in the year 2004
– The federal state of residence and the industry sector according to the
NACE classification as controls
• As identifying information for the participation equation:
– Firm size, based on the notion that it impacts the availability of training
opportunities to workers
– Workplace autonomy which plausibly impacts the need for training mea-
sures as more autonomous workplaces require more of it while not nec-
essarily impacting wages.
We also use the log of the post treatment wage – as seen (in levels) in the right panel
of figure 2.4 – to reduce the usual skew in the wage distribution, as is customary in
this strand of literature (Muehler et al., 2007).
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TABLE 2.1: Estimation Results for the OLS vs. Treatment Regression
OLS Treatment Regression
Outcome Selection
Current Year Age -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
[-0.004,-0.003] [-0.003,-0.001] [0.000,0.008]
Length of Education in Years 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
[0.019,0.023] [0.018,0.023] [-0.070,-0.043]
Marital Status -0.001 0.003 -0.063∗∗∗
[-0.007,0.005] [-0.003,0.009] [-0.099,-0.027]
Firm Tenure in Years 0.020∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015
[0.019,0.021] [0.017,0.019] [-0.006,0.036]






Constant 7.544∗∗∗ 7.248∗∗∗ -2.646∗∗∗
[7.493,7.594] [7.198,7.298] [-3.273,-2.019 ]
Set of Controls for
Federal State Yes Yes










Dependent Variable: Logarithmic Wage (OLS/Outcome equation),
Any Participation in Courses 2001-2003 (Selection equation)
95% confidence intervals in brackets
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ρ refers to the estimated correlation between errors in selection and outcome equation
χ2 and p-value refer to two-sided test of ρ being equal to zero
σ denotes the estimated standard deviation of the error in the outcome equation
λ denotes product of ρ and σ
Table shows maximum likelihood version of treatment regression
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Table 2.1 on the facing page shows the results from an OLS regression in its left
column and a treatment regression in the two columns on the right. The treatment
regression results are unstacked into two subcolumns, one for the outcome and one
for the selection equation. As for the latter, the identifying information from the
“firm size” and “occupational autonomy” variables is significant at the 1% level,
clearly signalling that it is relevant for the question whether taxpayers attended any
courses. The estimated ρ at the bottom of the output and its associated confidence
interval show that modeling the selection jointly with the outcome is vital, i.e. the
second part of (2.20) must be taken into account.
Interest rests primarily in the coefficient for the training dummy which in the case
of the OLS regression amounts to 17.1%, with the CI stretching from 14.5% to
19.7%, and for the treatment regression yields a return of 23.2%, with a CI from
21% to 25.2%. Note that the dependent variable is in logs and the results must be
read as percentage changes in the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the
independent variable.
To put the result into perspective, it must be born in mind that this rate represents
the compounded wage gain over the entire training period, i.e. from the payout for
the training course to 2004, attributable to the measure. Assuming a payout in 2002,
the point estimate of the rate per year drops to
(1 + 0.232)0.5 − 1 = 0.11
i.e. 11%, and thus to a level that puts it above, but within reach of the long-term
return on equity (DeLong and Magin, 2009). It is also consistent with the strand
of literature dealing with the “human capital return puzzle”, as represented by, for
instance, Panteghini (2001), where excess returns for human capital are traced back
to more severe frictions in human capital markets, such as short-sale constraints and
a constricted set of insurance options. We provide more discussion and exemplary
calculations in section 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 below.
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2.4 Tax Implications
2.4.1 Description of the Approach
Bearing in mind the theoretical notions expounded in section 2.2.1, we evaluate
the tax treatment of the costs and returns for the training courses taken by sample
members in a multi-period context. The literature surveyed in section 2.1 seems
to be largely set in a framework where the rates of return to a training measure
are expressed as a percentage gain in the worker’s wage, i.e. without reference
to either opportunity costs due to the passage of time or monetary layouts for the
measure (Muehler et al., 2007, table 4). The same sentiment is expressed succinctly
in Almeida and Carneiro (2009, p. 97): “...the literature estimating the effects of
training on productivity has little or no mention of the costs of training”.
The setup in the bulk of the literature renders a rate of return largely meaningless
as its desirability can only be evaluated with a reference to alternatives: At least
two rates are required. Indeed, Almeida and Carneiro (2009, p. 104) do remark
that “...company job training is a sound investment for firms that do train, possibly
yielding comparable returns to either investments in physical capital or investments
in schooling.” This quote shows that a comparison between competing investment
opportunities is required, although no numerical attempt is undertaken to provide
estimates for the returns of the alternatives.
The bulk of the literature insists on a single rate of return which shows the wage
gain of the post-intervention wage over the pre-intervention wage. However, the
question poses itself how fast the benefits of the training measures
1. materialize after the intervention
2. peter out once they have materialized.
Regarding the first point, there is not much literature to go by. The difficulties are
compounded by the fact that the exact date of the payout for the costs of the training
measure are not obtainable from the data. We assume a payout at the beginning of
the year 2002 in the calculations in section 2.4.3 which seems plausible for the most
recent training measure.
Regarding the second point, note that we do not attempt to employ a panel estimator
to investigate the further fate of participants’ wages – although the GSOEP data
may allow this. The panel estimation of treatment effects seems not to have been
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explored sufficiently in the theoretical econometrics literature (Kyriazidou, 1997;
Vella and Verbeek, 1999). The goal is thus to estimate (2.2) and (2.3) with the
available estimation results from table 2.1, and to make reasonable assumptions
about the fate of the economic rents accruing to training participants after the year
2004.
A related strand of literature that investigates the relationship between research and
development spending and stock market valuation of (R&D intensive) firms has
established conventions which can be harnessed here. Lev and Sougiannis (1996)
set out to estimate statistically reliable amortization rates for R&D spending, given
that accounting rules prescribe immediate expensing of these costs. As Lev and
Sougiannis (1996, p. 131) make clear, they let a period of 6 months expire after the
end of the fiscal year during which the R&D costs were incurred, and then measure
stock (excess-) returns for the subsequent 12 months. Chan et al. (2001), on the
other hand, simply assume a depreciation rate of 20%, so that the benefits die out
linearly over 5 years. In a recent contribution, Hall and Oriani (2006, p. 982)
assume a depreciation rate of 15%.
Almeida and Carneiro (2009, p. 100), on the other hand, distinguish between two
types of depreciation. Workers tend to forget existing knowledge, or it is rendered
obsolete by technological progress, and part of the existing knowledge evaporates
from the firm when workers quit their labor contracts and new workers establish
new contracts. For the former effect, Almeida and Carneiro (2009, p. 101) employ
a depreciation rate of 17%, while the combined effect amounts to 25%. Note that
only the first of these problems affects the current discussion as the focus is on the
worker, not on the knowledge stock within the firm.
To this end, we utilize the calculation of the marginal tax rate, as described in sec-
tion 2.2.2, to determine τl = τc = τt. Note that we evaluate the net present value
against a joint marginal tax rate for labor and capital income, as this approach co-
incides with the state of the German income tax law in force at the time. The later
adoption of a final withholding tax will thus not be discussed. Further note that
a time-dependent tax rate τt that is evaluated for the time period under considera-
tion should be used, i.e. according to the income tax schedule in force in the years
2001-2003. As the evaluation of the benefits from the training measure stretches out
for five years, the calculation could plausibly incorporate the tax schedules for the
years 2005 to 2008 as well. Yet the investment decision, i.e. the decision to conduct
a training measure, was taken under the expectation of the tax rates prevailing in
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2001/2003, so that it would be inappropriate to evaluate it against the realized tax
rates in 2005 to 2008.
To put the above into a nutshell, the calculation consists of
1. obtaining the difference in wages attributable to the training measure, as in
equation (2.20), for the year 2004: To establish the tax implications of the
results in section 2.3.4, predictions along the lines of equation (2.20) must
be obtained. Given the semilogarithmic nature of the estimation results in
table 2.1, we use the “smearing method” proposed by Duan (1983), which is
further described in section 2.5, to account for the influence of the error term
on the predictions.
2. getting the present value of the benefits defined in 1. by letting them die out
according to a linear depreciation schedule over the years 2004-2008
3. evaluating these benefits against the costs for the course obtained from the
dataset, i.e. discounting them back to the date of the payout of the costs
4. repeating 1. to 3. both in a before and after tax perspective
5. calculating the effective tax rate9 on the return from the training measure
according to NPV−NPVτ
NPV
, with the definitions for the acronyms given in equa-
tion (2.2) and equation (2.3) on page 35
6. varying assumptions to test for the sensitivity of the results.
2.4.2 Example for the Calculations
To illustrate the above, assume that the following constellation prevails for one of
the sample members: An initial payout of 850e – the mean payout in the sample –
for a course in 2002, leading to a wage gain of 23.2% – obtained from the coeffi-
cient for “Training Measure in 2001-2003” in table 2.1 on page 50, which elevates
his pre-intervention wage of 2,800e to 3,449.60e in 2004, for a gain of 649.6e.
Adopting the benchmark case of a 20% linear depreciation rate, the time line of the
human capital investment looks as follows:
9 See the treatment of effective tax rates on human capital in Weiss (2007, subsection 3.4.2) for
more comprehensive information.
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TABLE 2.2: Time Line for Example
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
-850 0 649.6 519.68 389.76 259.84 129.92 0
Assuming an interest rate of 10% and a tax rate of 30%, the pre-tax values yield an





We present the results of the calculations described above for the values of the
members of the dataset, i.e. using the original cost data, and the original marginal
tax rates as described in section 2.3.3, provided by respondents. Subsequently, we
carry out sensitivity checks in terms of interest rates and the depreciation rate of the
benefits.
As this exercise involves the evaluation of a time effect, the gross interest rate must
be fixed, which we take to be 6% initially. We also restrict the sample information to
sample members who report courses requiring more than a 100e initial outlay. The
questionnaire used to gather the data explicitly requests information regarding “fur-
ther professional education”, which prevents leisure activities from being reported
and ensures that (primarily) investment calculus led to the participation decision,
not the consumption value of the course activity. Further note that the restriction
lets the number of available course participants drop to 133, which should be taken
into account for the purpose of drawing conclusions from the results. We report the
cumulative distribution function of the resulting effective tax rates in figure 2.5 on
the next page.
As can be inferred from figure 2.5, the effective tax rates emanating at the assumed
gross interest rate of 6% are almost uniformly distributed between 20% and 45%
across the population of course participants. In comparison with the much more
dramatic results in Weiss (2007, sect. 3.4.2), the shorter duration of the benefits of
five years asserts itself and prevents the ETRs from dropping precipitously. The
distance to the nominal marginal tax rates for the sample members averages 6.3
percentage points, i.e. the effective tax rate is on average 6.3 percentage points
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lower than the nominal rate facing the taxpayer.
Varying the gross interest rate between discrete values of 2%, 6% and 10%, fig-
ure 2.6 on the facing page shows the time effect described in section 2.2.1 at work.
The mode of the estimated densities of the effective tax rates shifts markedly to the
left, the higher the interest rate rises, in accordance with intuition. The average de-
viation from the nominal tax rates is 4.5 percentage points at an interest rate of 2%,
and 9.8 percentage points at 10%.
Figure 2.7 on page 58 sets the interest rate back to 6%, the standard value assumed
here, and instead varies the depreciation rate of the wage benefits from the training
measure, in line with the above mentioned contributions of Chan et al. (2001) and
Hall and Oriani (2006). Note that the time period in years that elapses until the
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FIGURE 2.6: Estimated Density of Effective Tax Rates for Sample Members,
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where depr stands for the depreciation rate of the benefits, and the ceiling operator
ceil() gives the highest integer bigger than or equal to its argument. For the case of a





= 7 results. Higher
depreciation rates translate into lower payback periods, so that the density estimates
in figure 2.7 slide to the left the lower the depreciation rate is set. The average
distance to the nominal tax rates is 4.7 percentage points for the 25% depreciation
rate and 7.3/8.4 percentage points for 10% and 15%, respectively.
As an additional consistency check, we take a cue from the results in Almeida and
Carneiro (2009) and augment the direct costs – obtainable from the dataset – with
the forgone productivity costs that Almeida and Carneiro (2009, p. 103) estimate at
25% of the total cost, i.e. one third of the direct outlays. This estimate is well estab-
lished in the literature and also used by Trostel (1993, table 1). Note that this cost
element cannot be directly obtained from the dataset, as it would require more de-
tailed information on working hours spent during the training measure. Figure 2.8
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FIGURE 2.7: Estimated Density of Effective Tax Rates for Sample Members,
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on the facing page contains the results of this experiment, depicting a slight decline
in the ETRs when compared to figure 2.6, with the average deviation from nominal
rates at 6.1 percentage points at a gross interest rate of 6%.
2.5 Conclusion
In this contribution, the returns from training have been subjected to an analysis
that encompasses the income tax consequences of both the returns from the training
measure and the deductibility of the costs. The literature has so far failed to take
adequate account of the tax implications that these measures entail, even though
clearly they are bigger and more important by a huge multiple than the implications
of capital income taxation can plausibly claim to be.
Taxation induces a split of economic rents generated by training measures between
the worker, the firm and the tax authority. From the available dataset, only the
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FIGURE 2.8: Estimated Density of Effective Tax Rates for Sample Members,
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relationship between the tax authority and the worker could be inferred. In this re-
spect, the results are incomplete as they do not incorporate the “whole” picture. The
dataset that would be necessary to conduct research into this three way relationship
would have to include matched information about both the employer and employee
and their employment relationship while at the same time providing socio-economic
information that allows the analyst to assess the tax implications of the training
measure at hand. Importantly, tax information on the employee and the tax status
of the employer would be indispensable to arrive at after tax results. There seems
to be little such information in the literature researching these effects in a pre-tax
perspective, such as Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2006) for French and Swedish,
Kuckulenz (2007) for German and Dearden et al. (2006) for British data.
The results in this paper are in this important respect “conditional” on the assump-
tion that the third party, i.e. the employer, does not exert any pressure one way
or the other to change the results materially. This assumption may be dubious on
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account of several factors, the most salient of which would be that a labor relation-
ship does not allow either side to appropriate the entire benefits resulting from the
training decision. Conti (2005) and Dearden et al. (2006) do indeed contain evi-
dence pointing in this direction. Other avenues pursued by this strand of literature
include the effect of unionization on the frequency of training measures (Dustmann
and Schönberg, 2009) or a more explicit focus on the perspective of the firm instead
of the worker (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009).
Still, the results presented in section 2.4.3 do give a picture of the tax benefits that
investments in human capital confer upon those who choose to subject themselves
to them. The more dramatic results in Weiss (2007) are put into perspective by a
focus on a smallish investment opportunity, where the payouts by course partici-
pants only average 850e. Also, the period of benefits derived from the measures is
short, so that the time effect discussed in section 2.2.1 does not impact results too
severely. Given that millions of courses are taken per year, as shown in figure 2.1
on page 31, the resulting tax savings for these investments compared to traditional
savings products are substantial even if the individual case appears small.
Appendix: The Duan Method
The prediction of the level of wages from the results of a semilogarithmic equation
– as used in section 2.3.4 and for the predictions in section 2.4.3– according to Duan
(1983) assumes i.i.d. errors ui. From a simplified semilog specification
log (y) = X ′β + u (2.22)
the transformation to the conditional mean is given by
E (y|X) = exp (X ′β + u) = exp (X ′β) exp (u) (2.23)
The goal is to get a consistent estimate of the contribution of the errors to the expo-
nentiated mean. To this end, the Duan method assumes that a consistent estimator
of
E (exp (u)) (2.24)
is given by the sample average of the exponentiated errors, i.e.
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3.1 Introduction
“Human capital is the most important determinant of wealth and income for most
individuals.” This quote from Judd (1998) is borne out by both national income and
income tax statistics for Germany. The former regularly shows a fraction of 65% of
national income being distributed as wage income to private households (Federal
Statistical Office, 2008b, p. 621), while the latter demonstrates that wage taxa-
tion contributes in excess of 90% of the aggregate income tax base (Müller, 2004).
Figure 3.1 shows the historical development of contributions by the seven income
types recognized in German income tax law over the last two decades, reinforcing
the view that taxation of wage income – combined with the value added tax – has
been responsible for the lion‘s share of tax revenue – and its stability – in Germany.
FIGURE 3.1: Share of Income Types in German Income Tax Revenue
0% 10% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%












































This overwhelming importance of human capital – as an input factor in a knowl-
edge based economy and as a major source of factor incomes for most individuals
– is matched by the increasingly sophisticated research methods applied to human
64
Contribution 3 Do Germans React to the Commuting Allowance?
capital issues. Part of this literature is concerned with the tax influence on the acqui-
sition of human capital through schooling or – after the end of formal schooling –
on-the-job training (Nielsen and Sørensen, 1997; Jacobs and van Wijnbergen, 2007;
Hungerbühler, 2007). Quite another chunk of literature deals with the conditions
under which the existing human capital stock can be exploited. For instance, the
deductibility of work-related expenses has attracted some attention recently, as in
Baake, Borck and Löffler (2004) and Richter (2006).
A significant aspect of this exploitation process is the fact that, given modern means
of transportation, taxpayers have the opportunity to live far from their place of work,
and consequently have to ply the route to work on a more or less regular basis.
Zooming in on this process, the income tax treatment of the costs expended by tax-
payers to commute between their homes and places of work is controversial: Huge
volatility of tax rules governing the deduction of commuting costs is observable
both in a cross-sectional/international and longitudinal/national context.
In an international comparison, the rules governing the deductibility of commut-
ing costs are quite diverse1, and a common underlying ideology is hard to discern:
Great Britain, Spain, Ireland, Canada and the United States simply disallow the
deductions. Italy grants a high blanket deduction of 4,500 e, but disallows an item-
ized deduction of commuting costs. Switzerland and Finland allow a deduction
of the corresponding amount that the taxpayer would have to expend to use public
transportation to cover the same distance. Belgium allows a deduction of 75% of
costs if the taxpayer credibly itemizes her travel. Otherwise, an allowance of 15
eurocents is permissible. Luxembourg allows a standard deduction of 396 e for
distances of less than 4 kilometers which rises to a maximum of 2,970 e in step
with the distance traveled. Japan applies income dependent allowances instead of
itemized deductions so that there is no dependence on the actual distance to the
workplace.
In Germany, deductibility of commuting costs has been allowed via a commuting
allowance for the last couple of decades. Steenken (2002, p. 146) traces the historic
development of the German commuting deduction from the first beginnings in Prus-
sia to the state of the tax law around the year 2000. The German legislator initially
granted a relatively high allowance per kilometer of approximately 25 eurocents in
the later part of the 1950s, but required the taxpayer to prove that his costs were
1 Cf. Steenken (2002, pp. 183-187) and Bach (2003, p. 607). All descriptions refer to the year
2000.
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“necessary” (Bach, 2003, p. 603). The allowance was differentiated along the lines
of the means of transport used, and a maximum for the distance traveled was fixed
at 40 kilometers. The year 1967 witnessed a major reduction to approximately 18
eurocents which was motivated by the high volume of traffic hitting German roads.
The maximum of 40 kilometers was eventually abolished in 1971. The 1990s then
saw increases in the allowance to counteract the additional tax burden on fuel en-
acted at the same time.
The commuting allowance consists in a rate per kilometer of distance to the work-
place. To arrive at the yearly deduction from the income tax base, this rate needs to
be multiplied by the number of days of commuting and the distance in kilometers.
The development of the rate during the years 2001 to 2009 in the German income
tax code can be observed in table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1: Historical Development of the German Commuting Allowance
2001-2009
Year Allowance per km Max Blanket
0-10 km 11-20 km >20 km Deduction
2001 0.36 0.40 0.40 5,112 1,044
2002 0.36 0.40 0.40 5,112 1,044
2003 0.36 0.40 0.40 5,112 1,044
2004 0.30 0.30 0.30 4,500 920
2005 0.30 0.30 0.30 4,500 920
2006 0.30 0.30 0.30 4,500 920
2007 0.00 (0.30)∗ 0.00 (0.30)∗ 0.30 4,500 920
2008 0.00 (0.30)∗ 0.00 (0.30)∗ 0.30 4,500 920
2009 0.30 0.30 0.30 4,500 920
∗: Changed to amount in brackets retrospectively by judgment
of German Constitutional Court
Sources: § 9 (1) 4, (2) (2001-2006, 2009), § 9 (2) (2007-2008)
of the German Income Tax Code
Column “Blanket Deduction” refers to § 9a of the German Income Tax Code
Thin horizontal lines denote policy changes
All amounts in e
As can be inferred from the table, the rules governing the deduction have been sub-
ject to quite dramatic changes in the last couple of years. Starting from a graduated
scheme of a deduction of 0.36 e for the first 10 daily kilometers commuted, and
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0.40 e thereafter, the deduction was lowered to 0.30 e regardless of the distance
covered in 2004. This implies a reduction of 16.6% for the first 10 kilometer, and
of 25% thereafter. The year 2007 then saw the abolishment of the deduction for the
first twenty kilometers, while from the twenty-first kilometer onwards, it stayed in
place. The German constitutional court later struck down the 2007 law2, and the
rules in force in 2006 were reinstated and retrospectively applied for the years 2007
and 20083.
To appreciate the practical importance of the commuting allowance in the determi-
nation of the tax due on labor incomes in Germany, figure 3.2 shows the distribution
of itemized deductions for “wage income” in German income tax returns: Miscella-
neous items comprise approximately 19% of these deductions, additional expendi-
tures for food and dual households4 another 6% and 5%, respectively. The remain-
ing 70% of itemized deductions can be attributed to the commuting allowance.
Given the huge volume of the commuting allowance, several considerations shape
the rules governing its application: On the one hand, the opportunity to raise more
tax revenue on the part of the fiscal authorities is tempting. A “ballpark figure”
for a total abolition would be around 6 billion e for the year 20015. On the other
hand, distributional implications of changes in the allowance are also a key driver.
The 16 German federal states feature hugely different land masses which in turn
entails a different distribution of commuting distances. The political economy of
the commuting allowance, as modeled in Borck and Wrede (2005), consequently
pits small German federal states, such as Bremen and Berlin, against large – and
more populous – states6. The rules originally enacted for the fiscal year 2007, as
seen in table 3.1, can be interpreted as a result of the political clout wielded by
the larger German federal states7: For long distance commuters, the deduction was
maintained.
I contribute to the literature in the following ways: The consequences of variations
in the deductible amounts for commuting costs have not been subjected to thorough
2 Cf. the judgement handed down by the German Constitutional Court dated 12/9/2008.
3 Cf. Federal Ministry of Finance (2008).
4 Cf. § 4 (5) of the German income tax code for the legal rules governing these deductions.
5 Cf. Bach (2003, p. 606) and Federal Statistical Office (2005, table 11).
6 Official figures released in Federal Statistical Office (2005, table 8) show that almost 50% of
taxpayers who chose to claim the commuting allowance in their 2001 tax returns hailed from the
three federal states Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia.
7 Distributional aspects of the commuting allowance are covered in Bach (2003) and Kloas and
Kuhfeld (2003).
67
Do Germans React to the Commuting Allowance? Contribution 3







Add. Exp. Food Add. Exp. Dual Households
Source: Federal Statistical Office 2007, p. 15
empirical research yet. From such an investigation, one can expect insights into
the question how this deductibility shapes the behavior of taxpayers and whether
more or less generous allowances are likely to trigger reactions from taxpayers.
The legislator must take these reactions into account when changing the tax rules
governing commuting costs. Should the taxpayers turn out to react inelastically to
the deduction, the current rules could be regarded as waste, i.e. the subsidy implicit
in the deduction squanders tax revenue without eliciting any behavioral changes.
Any serious discussion of the environmental impact of commuting or the abatement
of urban sprawl (Su and DeSalvo, 2008) must be based on solid insights into these
reactions. Given the volume of tax receipts at stake, the state of the literature on
this question is not satisfactory, a sentiment echoed by Wrede (2001, p. 80): “...the
question is, with just a few exceptions, widely ignored in the theoretical economics
literature”.
To arrive at dependable results, I employ the insights of the well established treat-
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ment evaluation literature, pitting the observed behavior of a treatment and a control
group against each other before and after an intervention, which in this case con-
sists in the changes observed in the commuting allowance between 2003 and 2004,
which induced a steep drop in the deductible amounts for commuting. I utilize the
well known difference-in-difference estimator to extract the elasticity of commuting
kilometers with respect to the deduction.
There is a voluminous literature that can serve as examples of this strategy: The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States represents a prominent example of
just such an intervention, inducing a huge variation in tax rates that has helped re-
searchers identify the tax influence on several microeconomic behavioral margins.
Consequently, it has spawned a voluminous literature (Kubik, 2004; Kumar, 2008).
Gruber and Poterba (1994), for instance, pursue a similar research strategy to the
one in this paper, investigating the changed incentives for health insurance pur-
chases. Other examples include the research conducted by Leuven and Oosterbeek
(2004) into the tax effects of a special deduction for training expenditures, and Jap-
pelli and Pistaferri (2003) who exploit changes in marginal tax rates to identify the
tax influence on demand for life insurance assets in Italy in the 1990s.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the tax
treatment of commuting costs for the relevant years under German Income Tax Law
and introduces relevant research in this area. Section 3.3 provides the estimation
strategy, the dataset and the results, while section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Commuting Allowance
3.2.1 Legal Design of the Allowance
German income tax law distinguishes seven income types, as already seen in figure
3.1. The sum of these income types is subjected to a common tax schedule8. Ta-
ble 3.2 details the determination of this process for wage income in the year 2003
further. Row (1) gives the overall number of German taxpayers who filed tax re-
turns in that year. Row (2) shows the number and percentage of those who reported
gross income/deductions from wages: More than 85% of the tax return population
do contain these items.
8 A recent change in the law saw the introduction of a final withholding tax on capital income. The
text refers to the German tax law in 2003/2004.
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TABLE 3.2: Wage Income and Deductions in German Income Tax Returns for
the Year 2003
Gross Wages Deductions
(1) Overall # of taxpayers filing returns 27,008,320
(2) # of taxpayers reporting “Wage Income” 23,271,841 23,336,429
As Percent 86.17% 86.40%
(3) Volume (1,000) 827,995,421 57,684,777
Mean 35,579 2,472
Median 30,151 1,725
(4) # of taxpayers claiming blanket deduction 11,236,429
As Percent 48.15%
(5) # of itemizing taxpayers 12,100,000
As Percent 51.85%
(6) Volume of itemization (1,000) 41,800,000
(7) Thereof for Commuting Allowance (1,000) 29,176,400
As Percent 69.8%
All Amounts in e
Row (2) percentages: Fraction of all taxpayers in Row (1)
Row (4)/(5) percentages: Fraction of taxpayers in Row (2)
Row (7) percentage: Fraction of itemized deductions in Row (6)
Jointly filing couples are treated as one taxpayer
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2007, table 8)
Row (3) gives the overall volume of wage income and deductions reported, and
means and medians for them. Given that the sum of income from all seven income
types, as shown in figure 3.1, amounted to 938 billion e in 2003, the significance of
labor income is reinforced. Rows (4) and (5) then highlight the split between those
who claimed the blanket deduction and those itemizing their deductions. Row (6)
gives the volume of itemization, amounting to over 41 billion e in 2003, of which
almost 70% was claimed for commuting costs9 (row (7)). The numbers reported
in table 3.2 underscore both the importance of wage taxation within the German
income tax system, and the preponderance of the commuting deduction within the
itemized deductions allowed.
The commuting allowance, as stipulated in § 9 of the German Income Tax Code,
gives commuters a – partial – right to deduct the costs associated with their com-
muting behavior from their taxable income in the category “wage income”. The
allowance is granted according to the kilometers for a one-way trip to the work-
9 This information chimes with figure 3.2.
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place, multiplied by the number of days of commuting. Note that there is only
partial relief for the costs, as there is no dependence on the means of transport used
by the taxpayer or the type of car driven. An upper ceiling, as seen in the fifth
column of table 3.1, applies, unless the taxpayer commutes in a car.
Matters are rendered slightly more complicated by § 9a of the income tax code,
which provided a blanket deduction of 1,044/920 e in the years 2003 and 2004,
respectively, as seen in the sixth column of table 3.1. This deduction is available
regardless of actual expenses and granted without any itemization. It thus provides
a “floor” for the deduction.
As an example, consider a taxpayer who in 2003 commuted 17 kilometer on 180
days to his workplace. He calculated his deduction as
(10× 0.36 + 7× 0.40)× 180 = 1, 152
which exceeded the blanket allowance of 1,044e. Given a marginal tax rate of 20%
in the respective year, this deduction would be worth 1,152 e × 20%=230.40 e in
tax refunds for the year.
The same taxpayer, given constant commuting behavior, would calculate his deduc-
tion in the fiscal year 2004 as
17× 0.30× 180 = 918
inducing him to claim the blanket deduction of 920 e.
Note that, while the commuting deduction is the most important one for wage earn-
ers in Germany, it is by no means the only one, as figure 3.2 has already made clear.
Other itemized deductions can thus push the taxpayer over the blanket deduction as
well, and the estimation strategy in section 3.3 must take account of this fact.
3.2.2 Theoretical Research
The subjects of scientific interest to tax research can be divided along the lines
of time-, tax rate- and tax base- effects. While time effects concern the question
whether certain parts of the tax base are to be taxed in time period 1 or 2, tax
rate effects govern the question whether a higher or lower tax rate is to be applied.
A recent example for the former effect is given by the temporary reintroduction
of the accelerated depreciation of assets under the German income tax code: The
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distribution over time of the tax base is altered while its overall sum stays the same.
The latter effect is best thought of in terms of the recent introduction of a final
withholding tax on capital income in Germany: A certain part of the tax base is
subjected to a different tax rate.
Tax base effects – as the third category – concern the question which parts of the
taxpayer‘s economic activities are subjected to tax at all: The fundamental decision
to exempt home production from the tax code (Sandmo, 1990) provides a prominent
example. The commuting allowance itself also falls into this category, as the costs
associated with commuting are either deductible or not, depending on the rates
shown in table 3.1.
Empirical research into tax base effects has been conducted, for instance, in the
seminal contribution by Gruber and Poterba (1994) which looked into the tax in-
centives afforded by the deductibility of health insurance premia. Fifteen years later,
Selden (2009) picked up the same topic with a new dataset. Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2003) investigate how changes in the tax incentives provided by Italian income
tax law changed the demand for life insurance assets. Parry (2002) researches the
marginal welfare cost of tax base effects.
Within the strand of theoretical literature concerned with tax base effects, a small-
ish part is concerned with the deductibility of commuting costs from the income
tax base, with early contributions by Cogan (1981) and Parry and Bento (2001).
Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2009) recently investigated the relation-
ship between commuting and labor supply. Theoretical insights into workers’ actual
commuting costs are contained in van Ommeren and van der Straaten (2008) and
Ng (2008).
Empirical research into commuting behavior and the costs associated with it is de-
livered in van Ommeren and Fosgerau (2009) for the Netherlands. A separate strand
represented by Baldry (1998a,b) adds equity considerations to the discussion which
will not be germane for this paper.
For the German case, Wrede (2000) provides a theoretical treatment of the interac-
tion between deductibility of commuting costs and pre-existing distortions of the
labor-leisure choice induced by wage taxation. Note that the actual treatment of
commuting costs under income tax law via an allowance differs from the one as-
sumed in most models in the literature – where the “costs”, such as depreciation for
the car used or fuel, are made deductible. This observation is particularly relevant
for the case of Wrede (2000) where increased costs are shouldered by taxpayers
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to decrease traveling time: German income tax law would be invariant to any such
increase in expenditures, apart from the case where it leads to less distance covered.
Wrede (2009) and Borck and Wrede (2009) investigate the relationship between
commuting costs and taxation theoretically, as do Richter (2006) and Richter and
Söhn (2008). Empirical evidence regarding commuting behavior for Germany is
still sorely lacking, though, as only Ismer, Kaul and Rath (2008) provide a rare




The final goal of the estimation strategy pursued is the extraction of the elasticity of
the commuting distance with respect to the after-tax price paid for commuting one
kilometer. This elasticity can give the legislator an idea of the behavioral changes to
be expected from variation in the deductible amounts for commuting, as explained
in section 3.1.
The changes in commuting distances investigated here can be achieved through two
principal means: Taxpayers can choose to alter their place of residence or their place
of work, or both simultaneously (Wrede, 2001). Apart from changes in the commut-
ing distance, other microeconomic decisions could theoretically be impacted by the
allowance and investigated as well. As mentioned above, a voluminous strand of
literature concerned with the time-cost trade-off with regard to commuting (Wrede,
2000) would suggest research into, for instance, the decision to acquire a faster car
to cover the distance to the workplace more quickly. Yet given the nature of the
allowance, which ties deductibility solely to the distance commuted, the decision
to purchase a different car does not influence the deductible amount, as it is deter-
mined with respect to the distance plied by the taxpayer alone.
To isolate the tax influence on commuting behavior, the treatment evaluation lit-
erature, as surveyed by Cameron and Trivedi (2005, sect. 25), is relevant: Since
complete randomization of treatment assignment is unattainable in practice, the
correlations between assignment of treatment and outcome must be accounted for.
Variation in after-tax prices induced by policy changes is commonly exploited in
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this literature, as already mentioned in section 3.2.2. With regard to the tax ef-
fects mentioned above, most of this literature exploits a tax-rate effect that induces
changes in the after tax prices of the goods in question. In the present case, a tax-
base effect provides the variation. Given that the income tax liability is calculated
as the product of tax base and tax rate, this distinction does not preclude the appli-
cation of the methods in this strand of literature to the problem at hand.
One of the candidate methods offered by this literature is the “regression discon-
tinuity” design, as recently applied to a tax problem in Leuven and Oosterbeek
(2004). To successfully apply this method, a discontinuity in the treatment assign-
ment would be required. Given that the tax treatment of commuting kilometers
changed discontinuously at the 10 kilometer mark between 2003 and 2004, one
could imagine employing the commuters who used to commute 9 and 11 kilome-
ter in 2003, respectively, as the two comparison groups. The main obstacle to the
implementation of this strategy is given by the fact that a 10 kilometer commuting
distance alone does not suffice to take taxpayers above the blanket deduction. As
the exemplary calculations in section 3.2.1 show, a distance of at least 18 kilome-
ter is required to achieve this. Taxpayers below this threshold potentially claim the
blanket deduction, which means that their commuting behavior may well be unre-
sponsive to changes in the commuting allowance. While additional deductions for
other costs, contained in the “Other” category in figure 3.2, can achieve this, the
dataset does not deliver the detailed information required for this conclusion. Note
that this investigation is concerned with the marginal decision to commute one more
or one less kilometer, and the certainty that the blanket deduction has been exceeded
is necessary to be sure that the taxpayer does indeed make this decision according
to the after-tax price induced by the commuting allowance.
Instead, I employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005, sect. 22.6.). The most obvious requirement for this approach is a longitudinal
dataset, which I describe in more detail in section 3.3.2. While even a collection of
separate cross-sections would be sufficient for this exercise10, the SOEP data used
here allow the analyst to trace sample members with a unique id across time periods,
and thus provide proper panel data.
The main requirement imposed by this method with regard to the intervention is
that it should be exogenous to the behavior in question. In the case researched here,
10 Special conditions would in this case attach to the composition of the groups compared, though
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 770).
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the change in the deductibility should not reflect an impression on the part of the
legislator that there is too much commuting and that it should be discouraged via the
tax system. From the discussions at the time, there seem to be no such indications,
and the major concern seems to have been with the additional tax revenue raised by
lowering the allowance.
Several factors must be accounted for before a conclusion on the tax influence
should be made:
• Any time trends between the periods in question should be eliminated from
the estimate, i.e. a trend towards more or less commuting that would have
been observed even in the absence of the tax law change.
• Any fixed effects on the part of the individuals observed before and after the
tax law change should not influence the conclusions about the tax change.
For instance, the unobserved propensity to commute longer or shorter dis-
tances should be swept away during estimation. Indeed, the literature pro-
vides evidence for heterogeneous preferences for commuting, as recently
demonstrated for the United States in Small, Winston and Yan (2005).
For the case of the commuting allowance, I exploit the change in the deductible
amount per kilometer between the years 2003 and 2004 observable in table 3.1 as
the intervention in question. Arguably, the policy change from 2006 to 2007, which
abolished the deduction entirely for the first 20 kilometer of commuting distance,
could also be used. This particular change was immediately challenged and ul-
timately undone in court, though, so that many taxpayers may have simply stuck
with their existing commuting arrangement in anticipation of future policy rever-
sals. It thus would be difficult to see how any genuine reaction to the change could
be disentangled from the inevitable anticipation effects.
Regarding the treatment and control groups, several margins of identifying variation
in the after-tax price of commuting can be exploited. Gruber and Poterba (1994,
p. 711) enumerate three possible sources of variation, of which two are relevant
for the case at hand. On the one hand, the fact that the reduction of the commuting
allowance was uneven across the distance covered, with a kink at 10 kilometers,
might enable one to construct a sample of long distance and short distance com-
muters that should be unequally affected by the change. A taxpayer that commuted
more than 10 kilometer daily in 2003 would feel a more pronounced increase in
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the after-tax cost of his commuting in 2004. On the other hand, the deductions are
taken against the marginal tax rate, and high income taxpayers should feel the pinch
from a reduction of the deductibility more forcefully than low-income taxpayers11.
Given the above mentioned concern that taxpayers plying short distances might
claim the blanket deduction – and thus be expected to be unresponsive to changes in
the commuting allowance – a comparison between high and low income commuters,
who commute enough kilometers to exceed the blanket deduction with this item
alone, seems more promising. Denote the quantity of interest as
cit
[
τmi,t (TIi,t) , Di,t
]
which gives the after-tax cost of a commuting kilometer to be borne by individual i
in period of time t, given a marginal tax rate τm, determined by her taxable income
TI in this period, and the commuting distance Di,t plied in the given year12. The
marginal tax rate τm is determined by the taxable income in the respective year
under the progressive income tax schedule stipulated in § 32a of the German income
tax code.
Note how other literature mentioned above grapples with the issue of progressiv-
ity: Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004, p. 465) define their after-tax costs against the
(Dutch) corporation tax which featured a constant marginal tax rate of 35% at the
time. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, table 2) show the structure of the (Italian) in-
come tax in the 1990s which exhibited constant marginal rates within tax brackets.
Finally, Gruber and Poterba (1994, p. 724) pit “High-Income” and “Low-Income”
individuals against each other.
I follow a similar strategy in this paper, taking into account the concerns regarding
the influence of the blanket deduction mentioned above. I let the marginal tax rate
applicable to the labor income of the household head proxy for the marginal tax rate
τm, as in Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, p. 1786), and proceed under the – admit-
tedly – crude assumption that the middle class researched in this paper is mainly
endowed with human capital whose sale to the labor market feeds its consumption
streams. Additional capital income, which would drive up the marginal tax rate
11 The strand of literature that deals with the (limited) loss offset possibilities under tax law (Ahsan
and Tsigaris, 2009) is not relevant here. Losses for wage income are extremely rare, numbering
76,150 out of 22,860,534 cases in 2003 (Federal Statistical Office, 2007, table 5).
12 Conditioning on the commuting distance becomes necessary due to the graduated structure of the
commuting allowance in 2003.
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under the income tax law in 2003/2004, is thus neglected. I do include robustness
checks below to check for the validity of this assumption.
With treatment and control groups thus allocated, the difference-in-difference esti-
mation proceeds as follows: Let the commuting kilometers cki,t plied by a member
of group i ∈ [linc;hinc] in period t ∈ [2003; 2004] be generated by the following
data generating process:
cki,t = α + βt + γDhinc + δDhincD2004 + εit (3.1)
where “linc” and “hinc” stand for low and high income, respectively, and D• de-
notes a dummy variable for the subgroup/time period indicated in the subindex. A
time trend, capturing changes in the demand for commuting kilometers common to
both groups, is given by βt. α and γ capture fixed effects for the groups in question.
Differencing (3.1) across time subsequently sweeps away the fixed effects α and γ:
∆i = β2 − β1 + δ + (εi,2 − εi,1) (3.2)
Taking the difference between the time differences in (3.2) eliminates the drift term
βt:
∆hinc −∆linc = δ + (εhinc,2 − εhinc,1)− (εlinc,2 − εlinc,1) (3.3)
Taking expectations on both sides of (3.3),
δ̂ = ∆hinc −∆linc (3.4)
with δ̂ an unbiased estimator for the average treatment effect on the treated. To make
(3.4) econometrically tractable, the estimator δ̂ can be obtained from the equivalent
OLS regression of the stacked commuting distances on the interacted dummy for
the postintervention period times the dummy for the treated group:
ckt = α + βD2004 + γDhinc + δDhincD2004 + εt (3.5)
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3.3.2 Dataset
The GSOEP13 dataset used14 in this study is one of the most popular longitudinal
surveys of households for Germany. Since 1984, it has gathered data on a wide
array of sociological indicators, among them an extensive section dealing with the
labor market status and behavior of respondents.
The following demands are made for inclusion in my estimation sample:
• Only German born workers are considered.
• The subject must report labor income and commuting distances for both 2003
and 2004. One corollary is that sample members who discontinue their la-
bor supply due to the deterioration in the commuting allowance (Gutierrez-i-
Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2009) do not enter the estimation below.
• I restrict the estimation to workers between the age of 25 and 55 years (in
2003). This restriction is intended to reduce the hazard that the commuting
decision might be contaminated with education and early retirement decisions
- or anticipation thereof.
My retrieval, with these conditions imposed, yields a preliminary sample of 2,339
respondents for each year.
Marginal tax rates ranged between 20% and 48.5% in 2003 and 16% to 45% in
200415. I calculate the marginal tax rate for the sample members as follows: From
§ 32a of the German Income Tax Code 2003/2004, I obtain the formula for the de-
termination of the income tax liability, taking into account the marital status of the
respondent16. To arrive at the taxable amount that is fed to this formula, I calculate
13 The data used in this publication were made available to me by the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. Cf. Haisken-
DeNew and Frick (2005) and Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007) for further information.
14 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov
2007) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu).
The PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins
are available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-
DeNew and Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
15 The marginal rate can also be 0% for the taxpayers with less than 7,235/7,664e of taxable income
in 2003/2004, respectively. Commuting distances for this group rarely exceed the minimum
threshold of 18 kilometer demanded below.
16 Jointly filing couples are subject to lower tax rates if one spouse is the major “breadwinner”.
Note that the use of income deciles, as in Ismer, Kaul and Rath (2008, p. 62), would sweep this
problem under the rug.
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gross labor earnings for the years 2003 and 2004 from the available data. I also
make allowance for the blanket deduction, as stipulated in § 9a of the German In-
come Tax Code 2003, of 1,044/920 e. Special allowances (“Sonderausgaben”) are
granted according to § 10c of the German Income Tax Code 200317.
Given the marginal rates thus calculated, I stratify the sample into “low marginal tax
rate” and “high marginal tax rate” taxpayers. Taxpayers with marginal rates in 2003
between 20% and 28% are categorized as the former, while those featuring 42% and
higher marginal tax rates are entered into the latter group. Correlation between the
marginal rates in the two years is high at 0.8260, so that the classification is applied
to both years.
This approach to the division of sample members should be preferable to the one
used in Gruber and Poterba (1994, p. 724) where the choice is conditioned on
income itself: Joint filers and single filers should not be lumped together, given the
quite different marginal rates they face. Furthermore, the results reported below
are remarkably stable with regard to small changes in the selection rule – such as an
increase of the upper ceiling to 29% – which chimes with the observation by Gruber
and Poterba (1994, footnote 24). A further demand is that the commuting distances
must exceed 18 kilometer for inclusion in the estimation sample. As the exemplary
calculations in section 3.2.1 have shown, this minimum is required for the taxpayer
to exceed the blanket deduction no matter whether other deductions are itemized.
Also, sample members reporting only weekly commuting behavior are excluded.
This approach to the problem of the blanket deduction is extremely conservative, as
it is likely that other deductions will be present in a considerable number of cases,
and that the number of days should be higher for the daily commuters18. I also
cut off the upper 1% of commuting distances which in this sample means those
exceeding 150 kilometer. The extreme right tail of commuting distances is likely to
bump into the upper limit shown in column 5 of table 3.1 anyway, so not much is
lost owing to this restriction of the sample.
17 The provisions in § 10c remained constant between 2003 and 2004.
18 Official figures presented in Federal Statistical Office (2005, p. 18) drive home the point that a
weighted average of the number of days across all (including weekly) taxpayers is 172.
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3.3.3 Results
With these restrictions in place, the sample size drops to 630. A considerable loss
of observations is thus the price for a sharp distinction between the low and high
marginal tax rate groups used here. The distribution across years and groups and
some sample characteristics are shown in table 3.3.
TABLE 3.3: Sample Characteristics
2003 2004 Total














Average gross labor earnings
Average marginal tax rate
Source: GSOEP 2003/2004
As can be inferred from the table, the overall sample is more affluent than the av-
erage taxpayer, with a mean gross labor income over 40,000 e compared to the
35,500 e found in table 3.2, and the increased marginal tax rates19 that this income
entails. The two groups are roughly similar with regard to the age structure. The
high income group is substantially larger, leading to lower standard errors for the
means computed below.
The fact that the sample is not representative of the population of German taxpayers
in terms of indicators like labor income and age does not invalidate the results: The
estimation derives its information from the differences over time and groups that
19 Note that the sample consists of both joint and single filers so that a weighted average results.
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sweep away all the fixed effects affecting demand for commuting kilometers. All
the time invariant factors, such as the propensity to commute, do not confound the
conclusions.
The results of the difference-in-difference estimation are shown in table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimation for the Commuting Distances
Sample
Low Income High Income Difference
between Groups
2003 35.34 38.95 3.61
(1.62) (1.78) (2.41)
2004 34.56 39.57 5.01
(1.60) (1.86) (2.46)
Difference - 0.78 0.62
across time (2.28) (2.58)
Difference in 1.40
Difference (3.44)
Legend: Mean/Difference in Means
(Standard Error of Mean)/(SE of Difference in Means)
Source: GSOEP 2003/2004
The table makes clear the substantially higher commuting distances in the high in-
come sample, with a difference that increased between 2003 and 2004. A t-test
between the groups pooled across the two years yields a rejection at the 5% level
against the two-sided alternative (p-value 0.0169). Surprisingly, the higher after-tax
cost in 2004 for the high income commuters has not dampened their commuting
behavior: Actually, the distances increase for them, while the lower income sample
members reduce them. Finally, the difference-in-difference result shows the treat-
ment effect to be positive instead of the expected negative one, with a large standard
error20: No firm conclusion either way is apparent from these results, raising the
specter of taxpayers being indifferent to the allowance in the short run.
Sensitivity tests are conducted to check the result for stability. The political econ-
omy of the commuting allowance, as discussed in section 3.1, would suggest a divi-
sion of the sample into large and small states. Official statistics21 show that the fed-
20 All reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
21 Cf. Federal Statistical Office (2005, table 8).
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eral states Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony and North-Rhine
Westphalia accounted for over two thirds of claims for the commuting allowance in
2001. Restricting the analysis in table 3.4 to these five states – accounting for over
58% of Germany‘s land mass between them – yields a result remarkably stronger
than the one in table 3.4. The difference-in-difference estimate now comes in at
4.11, on a standard error of 4.07. The increase in the difference between the groups
over time becomes much more pronounced (in comparison with the last column of
table 3.4), with the point estimate increasing from 3.11 in 2003 to 7.22 in 2004.
To check for the uncertainty associated with the marginal tax rates, I add informa-
tion about other household income in 2003 to the dataset. Those with large non-
labor income components could well be misclassified in the initial analysis, given
that only labor income is employed to derive the marginal tax rate22. The SOEP data
contain information about income from dividends and saving accounts. For the sen-
sitivity check, I exclude sample members with such income in excess of 5,000 e
from the estimation, resulting in the removal of only 12 of the 630 persons. The
results are similar to the ones obtained in table 3.4: The difference-in-difference es-
timate is computed as 1.51, on a standard error of 3.46, confirming the conclusions
above. Overall, the absence of any significant result suggests that the behavioral
changes induced by changes in the commuting allowance are largely indeterminate
in the short run. Indeed, although the point estimates for the treatment effects are
positive, all reported results feature 95% confidence intervals that comprise both
positive and negative values.
3.4 Conclusion
The effects of the commuting allowance on commuting behavior in Germany have
been less than comprehensively investigated in the literature so far. This is sur-
prising given the huge volume of income tax revenue at stake and the increased
environmental concerns in connection with urban sprawl in public discussions. The
results presented here show that taxpayers in Germany do not exhibit statistically
significant short run behavioral changes when confronted with an increase in the
after-tax cost of commuting. Given this relative inertia, the German legislator may
reconsider the strategy attempted in 2007, i.e. a reduction in the commuting al-
22 Cf. the description in section 3.3.1.
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lowance, to raise more income tax revenue. An across-the-board cut to, say, 0.20 e
per kilometer may well be simultaneously distributionally acceptable and unlikely
to trigger much in terms of a reaction on the part of taxpayers or a challenge at
the constitutional court. Indeed, the main reasoning provided by the court when it
struck down the 2007 law was the asymmetry between the tax treatment for the first
20 kilometer commuted and the remainder23.
It is of course arguable that the effect of altered commuting allowances only mate-
rializes over time, and that the research approach chosen here thus masks important
results to be had from a long-term analysis. Such an analysis would have to include
the variation in the taxation of car fuel, as an important input factor to enable com-
muting behavior, as well. This additional aspect was indeed a driving force behind
increases in the allowance enacted in 199024.
Any serious discussion of the merits of granting commuting allowances also has
to factor in the significant compliance costs involved. The fact that an allowance
is granted instead of an obligation to itemize all costs connected with commuting
relieves both the taxpayer and the tax authorities of some of the potential costs. Yet
the common practice of ride sharing to work among colleagues or the additional
deductions for accidents while commuting still give rise to many clashes that ulti-
mately have to be resolved in court. The number of days a taxpayer commuted in
a given year relies on self reporting, which is bound to lead to controversy. And
the shortest available distance from the place of residence to the workplace – which
the law requires taxpayers to choose for purposes of the commuting allowance –
give rise to further complications. Only a total prohibition of the deduction, such
as practiced in other developed countries, can obviate these costs. The estimated
revenue gain reported above25 of 6 billion e per year is thus a lower bound for the
economic gains to be expected from a total abolition.
23 Cf. footnote 2 and table 3.1.
24 Cf. Steenken (2002, p. 154).
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4.1 Introduction
Discussions concerning the taxation of “the rich” have dominated the German po-
litical and social landscape for a long time. The perception that “the rich” do not
adequately contribute their share to the public finances is deep-rooted, yet scien-
tific tests of this presumption are quite rare. The contribution by Bach, Corneo and
Steiner (2008)1 constitutes an attempt to add to the public discourse by calculating
the tax burden weighing on “the income rich” in the years 1992 to 2002. To this end,
BCS employ a dataset merged from the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP),
provided by the DIW, Berlin, and the whole population of income tax returns for
Germany for the years 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2002. Their major finding is an
“effective average income tax rate of the German economic elite – the top 0.001%
quantile of the gross income distribution – ... (of) about 34 percent, which is well
below the legislated tax rate.” They also report significant variation over time, with
the rate ranging from a low in 1995 of 31% to a high in 1998 of 45%. Similar results
are reported for the top 0.0001% quantile where the average income tax rate drops
to only 32.0% for 2002 (BCS, p. 17).
While this result seems shocking at first blush and might lead one to conclude that
the superrich are not contributing adequately to the German tax base, we discuss
possible reasons for it and provide appropriate remedies. BCS restrict their analy-
ses to the income tax burden. Yet, while some economic activities, e.g. workers’
labor supply, are subject to personal income taxation alone, this is not true for the
case of income from business activity where both the local trade tax and, for in-
corporated businesses, the corporation tax reduce the sole destination of earnings,
the consumption of a natural person. As it happens, the top 0.001% quantile2 of
the German taxpayers derive their major earnings stream from business activity
(68.84% of adjusted gross income) while fully 94.96% report any earnings from
this source.
BCS conduct their analysis with regard to a single year – necessitated by the lack
of panel data sets covering taxation in Germany – and thus neglect the intertem-
poral aspect of economic activities that investment theory is imbued with. This
point is made all the more poignant as the intertemporal aspect of taxation “creeps
1 Henceforth BCS. As there are three almost identical versions of the paper, we cite the most recent
and important discussion paper series where it has been published.
2 Measured by adjusted gross income (defined in section 4.3.2). Note that jointly filing couples
would count as one unit in this analysis.
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in through the backdoor”: German Income Tax Law allows taxpayers to conduct
unlimited carry-forwards and limited carry-backs of tax losses, which BCS com-
pletely ignore. If carry-forwards and carry-backs lower the tax payments due in the
year under examination but are disregarded for purposes of the income tax burden
attributed to this year, the resulting number is biased toward an artificially low tax
rate.
Furthermore, BCS interpret the deduction of capital expenses and accruals, i.e. the
transformation of cash flows into tax bases, as “loopholes”. The term “loophole”
is also applied to the losses resulting from the income type “renting and leasing”
which is subsequently truncated arbitrarily at –5.000 e. In the same vein, BCS
attempt to explain the astonishingly low tax rates that they find with reference to
terms such as “loophole”, which appears five times throughout the text, “tax base
erosion” (twelve appearances) and “tax avoidance” (nine appearances).
Additionally, BCS devote an entire section to the definition of an “adjusted gross
income” which differs markedly from the legal definition supplied by the income
tax code. It also diverges from the well-established and readily available concept of
economic profits as a measure of economic income. Being derived from investment
theory, the notion of economic profits is based on a multi-period concept. Similarly,
the concept of “effective tax rates” is only rendered meaningful in an intertemporal
perspective.
We thus recap the theory behind the academic concepts applied in BCS. Along the
way, we highlight the instances where these multi-period concepts are not amenable
to cross-sectional, i.e. single period, analyses. A frictionless transfer is not feasible,
leading us to conclude that any tax rate computed on the back of the available data
can only be interpreted as a nominal tax burden. As a prominent example, the ap-
parent rule that faster depreciation today translates into less depreciation in the next
year, serves to highlight the problematic nature of a single-period view: Eventually,
today’s lower tax base catches up with the taxpayer. We tentatively improve on the
numbers provided by BCS, remedying several of the points of critique above and
labeling the results as a “comprehensive nominal tax rate”. Ironically, and in con-
trast to BCS, many publications concerning business taxation neglect the personal
tax and solely integrate the corporate tax. We reestablish the link between corporate
and personal taxation that is quite standard in modern economic thought. Our ar-
gumentation dissects their definition of an “effective tax rate”, where we argue that
ultimately, the numerator, the denominator and the number itself are misleading.
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We provide an extensive analysis of “comprehensive nominal tax rates” on the pop-
ulation of German taxpayers in 2001. The spotlight put on top incomes by BCS is
mirrored in our analysis. Our tentative measure of a tax rate that explicitly accounts
for a comprehensive tax burden, encompassing a reasonable definition of pre-tax
economic income and an enlarged set of taxes weighing on it, results in “compre-
hensive nominal tax rates” that are up to 12 percentage points higher than the tax
rates calculated by BCS. As it turns out, the finding of a higher tax rate is robust
across the entire income distribution and increases in income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 4.2, we critically examine
the theoretical approach adopted in BCS. In section 4.3, we provide an extensive
analysis of “comprehensive nominal tax rates” on top incomes and show that a com-
prehensive, bird’s eye view of the tax burden for the income rich leads to sharply
different conclusions. Section 4.4 concludes. An Appendix provides additional
statistical material.
4.2 Theoretical Examination of the Approach in Bach
et al. (2008)
4.2.1 The BCS Approach
The BCS contribution is part of a broader literature that researches the issues of in-
equality and its reduction through government policies, in particular through taxa-
tion, and the degree of “effective progressivity” that the German tax system exhibits.
BCS cite most of these contributions in their chapter 1. The authors themselves have
contributed to the subject matter before, in Bach, Corneo and Steiner (2005), with
a focus on tax issues, and Bach, Corneo and Steiner (2007), with a focus on the
distribution of market incomes. These papers share several common traits that we
subject to a critical examination below, in particular the same database3 and the fo-
cus on the income tax burden alone4. The correction for presumed “tax avoidance
strategies” or the – arbitrary – truncation of losses from renting and leasing5 provide
other examples.
3 Cf. subsection 4.3.1.
4 Cf. subsection 4.2.5.
5 Cf. subsection 4.2.5.
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Bach et al. (2005, sec. 4.3) also employ the concept of effective tax rates that we
discuss in subsection 4.2.2. Table 11 in that chapter is quite similar in structure
to table 4 of BCS: Both tables consistently find effective tax rates for the top 1%
fractile of the German income tax population well below the legislated nominal
tax rates, leading to the conclusion “Tax progression is real and strong, although
definitely not as strong as the statutory tax rates would imply.” (Bach et al., 2005,
p. 24).
4.2.2 Effective Tax Rates
The development of effective tax rates in the literature was instigated by King and
Fullerton (1984) and extended by Devereux and Griffith (1999). This strand of the
literature has witnessed huge growth since then (Knirsch, 2007). It is based on the
notion that nominal tax rates as stipulated by tax codes do not adequately express
the tax burden weighing on economic activities. Quite to the contrary, nominal tax
rates are meaningless numbers because they are applied to a tax base that does not
coincide with investors’ economic goals. Investment theory is based on the notion
of investors’ goals defined as the discounted consumption possibilities created by an
investment over and above those readily available from some standard investment,
i.e. a savings account. If the definition of the tax base in the tax code does not hit
these goals but anything other than them, then the nominal tax rate is no longer a
valid expression of the reduction of the degree to which investor reach their goals
after tax. A comparison of nominal tax rates, e.g. across countries, is consequently
not meaningful.
A very general formulation of effective tax rates (ETR) that remedies the aforemen-
tioned deficiencies is thus (Niemann, Bachmann and Knirsch, 2003)
ETR =
Economic goal before tax – economic goal after tax
Economic goal before tax
=
Tax wedge
Economic goal before tax
. (4.1)
Importantly, the concept of effective tax rates is inherently designed to address a
multi-period context because it builds on investment theory. Departing from equa-
tion (4.1), the “economic goal” has been defined in various ways in the literature,
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e.g. as net present values, final values or rates of return as defined by Baldwin
(1959). Regardless of the specific figure employed to calculate equation (4.1) on
the preceding page, they all address multi-period contexts. If this property of effec-
tive tax rates is disregarded, the connection to the literature is severed.
In contrast to the multi-period effective tax rate models, BCS, p. 10 derive their
measure of effective taxation from a single period calculus. Single-period expres-
sions, as they are typical of cost accounting or producer rents in microeconomic
theory, are unlikely to cover the tax burden on multi-period investments such as
real estate or shareholdings adequately. What would a single-period ETR be able
to deliver in terms of information about tax effects, i.e. tax base, tax rate and time
effects? As time effects are by the nature of the construction of a single-period ETR
out of the equation, only tax base and tax rate effects can be detected.
BCS not only deliver one effective tax rate, but rather a whole vector of effective tax
rates over points in time. They define6 their “effective average tax rate”, denoted
here as ETRBCSt , as the assessed income tax liability (plus solidarity surcharge)
paid in time t, denoted as PITt, divided by the adjusted gross income in t, denoted
as AGIt.
Consider AGIt being the economic goal before tax and AGIt − PITt being the
economic goal after tax, then ETRBCSt can be written as the well-known effective
tax rate approach from equation (4.1).
ETRBCSt =






The interpretation of ETRBCSt cannot be the same as in a multi-period approach as
one year’s income is not an economic goal in itself. Therefore, ETRBCSt delivers a
tax rate that tells us how much in taxes one investor paid in relation to an – imprecise
– measure of income in one year, i.e. an adjusted nominal tax rate.
Furthermore, BCS establish entire time series of ETRs7, which might leave the
impression of an intertemporal perspective being adopted. Crucially, though, the
available micro datasets for Germany do not allow one to track taxpayers’ behaviour
over time. Several cross-sectional datasets appended to each other cannot make up
for this deficiency. They do not contain unique id variables which could establish a
link between them. There is no mention of this problem in BCS, nor is an idea of
6 BCS, p. 15.
7 Cf. table 4 on page 17.
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how to interpret the varying tax rates given.
4.2.3 Different Notions of Income
Quite apart from the doubts related to the interpretation of ETRBCSt as an ETR,
the definition of the income employed to compute this number leads to yet another
problem. Consider for example an individual who purchases 0.5% of the equity
of an incorporated business8 for 100 e. After holding the non-dividend paying
stocks for 5 years, it is sold for a nominal capital gain. Discounting the proceeds
of the share sale amounting to 133.82 e at the prevailing interest rate i = 6%, the
investment turns out to be marginal before tax.
Applying the concept of economic profits, the microeconomic view would consider
the individual to have income each year due to an appreciation in each period: with
each passing year, the final payment in t = 5 draws nearer. In a macroeconomic
view, the national accounts would include this gain in t = 5. The notion of in-
come espoused in the German tax code, the taxable income (fiscal view), would
lead to zero income since the German income tax code of 2001 did not tax capital
gains from minority shareholdings that had been realized after the expiration of the
speculation period of one year.
TABLE 4.1: Differing Income Definitions
Income according to
t Cashflow Economic Profit National Accounts German Tax Law until 2008
0 –100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 6.36 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 6.74 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 7.15 0.00 0.00
5 133.82 7.57 33.82 0.00
The three definitions result in periodical income (economic profit), income at real-
ization (national accounts), or in no income at all, as shown in table 4.1. Adding
to the confusion thus created, BCS applied a fourth definition of income, their ad-
justed gross income (AGI), that they derived from taxable income9. In microeco-
8 Mainly AGs and GmbHs according to German company law.
9 A detailed discussion of the derivation can be found in subsection 4.3.2 on page 108.
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nomic approaches, however, the concept of the economic profit is well established
and remains the yardstick for economic income for which the AGI does not even
serve as a rough approximation.
We now provide a simple numerical example of the time-series behaviour of the
single-period ETRs based on the AGI by BCS and on the economic profit. Given
the prominence accorded to income from renting and leasing, we model a taxpayer
over a period of five years and highlight the result of a narrow focus on data for one
specific year.
Suppose an individual taxpayer invested 1 million e in real estate, where the In-
come Tax Code stipulates a straight-line depreciation rate of 2% per year. From the
income tax statistic, we observe the income from renting and leasing. Multiplying
this income with the investor’s marginal tax rate gives the personal income tax in
t, PITt, which is attributable to the real estate investment. Adding the deprecia-
tion allowances at each point in time, we can derive the cash flow CFt. At the end
of t = 5 the house is sold for 800,000 e, the taxpayer realizes a capital loss of
100,000 e10. The investment’s economic profit, EPt is defined as cash flow in t
less economic depreciation. BCS’ adjusted gross income equals the tax base except
for losses from renting and leasing exceeding 5,000 e, which are truncated.
TABLE 4.2: Derivation of the Cash Flow
t 1 2 3 4 5
(1) CFt 200.00 0.00 250.00 4.56 800.00
(2) Deprt 20.00 20.00 20,00 20.00 20.00
(3) TaxBaset 180.00 –20.00 230.00 –15.44 –120.00
(4) PITt 75.60 –8.40 96.60 –7.78 –50.40
(5) EPt 60.00 51.60 54.69 42.98 45.28
(6) AGIBCSt 180.00 –5.00 230.00 –5.00 –105.00
Given the economic profit and the adjusted gross income in each period, we com-
pute the vectors of ETRs from equation (4.2):
The variation from –111% to 176% of the “ETR” based on the economic profit
and equation (4.2) indicates the inaccuracy of ETREPt as a tax burden measure.
Applying the BCS definition of the adjusted gross income to this example results in
an “ETR” ranging from 42% to 168%. Hence, even if one applies the universally
10 We assume that he can fully offset the loss against other income.
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TABLE 4.3: Comparison of Single Period ETRs
t 1 2 3 4 5
(4)/(5) ETREPt 126.00% –16.28% 176.61% –15.09% –111.30%
(4)/(6) ETRBCSt 42.00% 168.00% 42.00% 155.60% 48.00%
accepted measure of the economic profit, single period ETRs lack any explanatory
power. Any deviation from this concept, such as the adjusted gross income in BCS,
does not render the measure meaningful, either.
By contrast, the ETR based on Baldwin rates of return11 delivers an ETR of 44.48%,
indicating that the real estate investment carries a higher tax burden than the alter-
native investment since the present value of the economic depreciation is higher
than the present value of the deduction allowed by § 7 (4) of the German Income
Tax Code. This interpretation would not have been possible with any of the single
period “ETRs” as they cannot account for time effects.
4.2.4 The Relation between Economic Income and Taxable In-
come
The numerical example above has shown that the economic profit and the tax base
differ at each point in time and in their time series behaviour. This section discusses
the restrictions under which the economic profit can be derived from the taxable
income in a single period context and how the resulting single period ETRs can be
interpreted. If these restrictions held, then we could use the available cross-sectional
data to compute the taxpayer’s economic profit and interpret the resulting number.
Consider the earningsE∗t as well as the expenseA
∗
t to be constant and to be different
from the incoming payments Et and the outgoing payments At respectively, then
the cash flow and the tax base evolve as:
CFt = Et − At (4.3)
TBt = E
∗
t − A∗t . (4.4)
Under the assumption that the cash flow, the tax base and their components are
constant until infinity, the income from the microeconomic view, i.e. the economic
11 The pre-tax net present value is zero in order to allow for any meaningful interpretation.
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profit, is equal to the cash flow but not necessarily equal to the fiscal income. Con-
sequently, the tax base has to be adjusted. The following relation between economic
and taxable income has to hold to validate the interpretation of the outcome from
cross-sectional data.
EPt = CFt = TBt + [Et − E∗t ]− [At − A∗t ] = const. ∀ t (4.5)
A prominent example for a necessary adjustment is given by the income from divi-
dends under the half income system where both the earnings and the expenses have
to be revised. At first, dividends are included with 50% of the gross distribution in
the taxable income. Additionally, the gross dividend is lowered by corporate and
local trade tax. Furthermore, consider this shareholding to be debt-financed, then
only half of the interests paid can be deducted from the taxable income, while the
cash flow was lowered by the full expenses. Consequently, the earnings side as well
as the expense side has to be adjusted in order to deliver an accurate measure of
the economic profit12. Therefore, the taxable dividend has to be adjusted on the
earnings side .
The economic profit can only be derived from the taxable income observed in a
cross-sectional dataset if the following restrictive assumptions hold:
• Infinite time horizon,
• Cash flow is constant over time,
• Tax base is constant over time,
• Incorporated businesses do not retain earnings,
• Economic depreciation is equal to deduction allowed by tax code,
• Accumulated tax burden is known for all income fractiles,
• Origin of foreign income, especially dividends, is known
• Capital gains are not realized, since tax burden on capital gains is not mea-
surable.
12 A full overview of adjustments for the individual income fractiles is presented in section 4.3.2.
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If these restrictions held, then the application of equation (4.2) would deliver a tax
rate which could be interpreted as the comprehensive nominal tax burden of the
economic profit in the examined year.
4.2.5 The Tax Burden on Economic Activities
Relevant Tax Rules for Incorporated and Unincorporated Business
With regard to the taxes constituting the tax burden on economic activities, fig-
ure 4.1 highlights those central to the main thrust of our argumentation, emphasiz-
ing the importance of the integration of both the personal and the corporate level.
FIGURE 4.1: From Gross Economic Activity to Consumption
Gross Earnings
Consumption subject to VAT
CorporateTax +
Solidarity SurchargeLocal Trade Tax
Income Tax + 






Renting and Leasing, 
Interest
Each of these taxes comes with its own set of rules concerning the determination of
the tax base and tax rates. A priori, it is not possible to discount any of these taxes
as irrelevant for the measurement of effective taxation13. In particular, the inclusion
of the tax burden on the corporate level is mandatory and largely uncontroversial:
13 The universe of taxes possibly impacting the tax burden on economic activities exceeds the one
in figure 4.1 and could conceivably include the Value Added Tax and property taxes.
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While from a legal standpoint corporate and personal taxes are owed by different le-
gal persons, economists trace profits from their origin on the corporate level to their
sole final destination: The consumption of an individual or a household. Along the
way, taxation reduces the consumption value repeatedly. For the distributional con-
sequences, it does not matter what a tax is being called and whether it is collected
on the corporate or on the individual level.
The refusal of BCS to take into account the enlarged universe of taxes depicted in
figure 4.1 contradicts with the legislator himself: § 35 of the German income tax
code establishes a link between the income tax and the local trade tax, providing a
relief in the former for the burden represented by the latter14. The obvious corollary
of this construction, i.e. that the legislator is aware of the accumulated tax bur-
den established by both taxes and the possibility of a substitution between them, is
turned on its head in BCS: The relief stipulated in § 35 is incorporated into their
calculations, but the concomitant burden of the local trade tax is ignored.
BCS choose to include the Income Tax15 and the Solidarity Surcharge on the “Per-
sonal Level” in their calculations16. There is no explicit explanation of this re-
striction, nor is this choice self-evident in the light of the foregoing discussion.
Interestingly, the corporate level is barely touched upon: The gross dividend before
corporation tax is imputed (BCS, p. 9) rather crudely, neglecting the local trade tax
burden17. The more fundamental decision to omit the corporate level entirely is not
made transparent at all and its effect will be the matter of the following paragraphs.
We show the dimension of the underestimation bias in BCS that can be traced back
to the neglect of the local trade tax. This bias is prevalent for the rich as the top 1%
quantile18 generates 17.89% of their total income from business activity. The in-
come from unincorporated business is for the top 0.1% quantile the most important
income component with 37.83% of the gross income. This share rises to 68.84% for
the top 0.001% quantile and to 78.66% for the top 0.0001% quantile respectively19.
14 See table 4.4 on the facing page.
15 Abbreviated “PIT” in their paper.
16 BCS, p. 15.
17 BCS seem to suggest in their conclusion that a “move from the taxpayer level to the individual
level – taking household composition into account – ... seems an interesting topic for future
research”.
18 The quantiles reported in this section refer to the overall amount of income inferred from the
almost 30,000,000 German tax returns in 2001.
19 Cf. table 4.10.
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With regard to this point, we provide a comparison of the comprehensive tax burden
and the “narrow tax burden” by BCS for the income from unincorporated businesses
in table 4.4. German income tax law allowed taxpayers to deduct the local trade
tax from its own tax base and from the income tax base until 2007. Depending on
the local municipal rate of the local trade tax, which we fix at 400%20, the initial
local trade tax burden, factoring in its deductibility from its own tax base (120),
was 20 (16.67%). On the remainder (100), income tax – with 48.5% as the highest
marginal rate in 2001 – and solidarity surcharge was due (51.17)21. Furthermore, §
35 of the German income tax code provided for additional lump-sum tax relief with
regard to the local trade tax (9.50).
TABLE 4.4: Calculation of Tax Liability for an Unincorporated Business
Our approach BCS
(1) Business Profit=Income 120 100
(2) Local Trade Tax –20 –
(3) Income from Business Activity 100 100
(4) Personal Income Tax1 –51.17 –51.17
(5) Paragraph 351 +9.50 +9.50
(6) After Tax 58.33 58.33
CNTR /ETRBCS 51.39% 41.67%
1Solidarity Surcharge contained in Income Tax Payment as in BCS
From table 4.4, a tax burden on a business profit of 120 of 61.67 can be inferred,
leading to a comprehensive nominal tax rate (CNTR) of 51.39%. BCS’ narrow fo-
cus on the income tax burden alone – without accounting for the local trade tax paid,
but factoring in the tax relief provided for it by § 35 – would calculate a tax burden
of 51.17-9.50=41.67 and come up with an “effective tax rate” of 41.67%, almost ten
percentage points lower. The “true” tax burden of unincorporated business that rep-
resents the most important income source for the rich and superrich is consequently
underestimated by BCS. As the observed income tax liability – including the § 35
offset – constitutes the nominator of their ETR, the ETR itself is unambiguously
biased downward. Worse yet, BCS account for the local trade tax offset in their
20 This simplification is suspended in our calculations in section 4.3, in favor of a more detailed
estimate of the applicable municipal rate: We distinguish between the former east and west. A
more detailed analysis on the level of federal states was not allowed by the anonymisation laws.
21 We omit the liability for church tax in all our calculations.
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income tax measure without acknowledging the underlying local trade tax payment
that the offset was supposed to mitigate in the first place.
In the same vein, the corporate and the local trade tax is omitted when measuring the
tax burden on the income from incorporated business, i.e. income from dividends.
The lower numerator – due to the omission – entails a lower effective tax rate. If
we take into account the empirically observed concentration of shareholdings in the
upper quantiles of the German income distribution, then this effect does not balance
out over the entire distribution; instead it biases the results in favor of the impres-
sion that the rich do not pay taxes adequately as for the income of incorporated
business22.
With regard to this point, we compute the resulting bias for distributed profits23. We
integrate the corporate and the personal level into an exemplary calculation for both
the full imputation system (FIS) that was in effect until 2001 and the half income
system (HIS) valid from 2001 to 200724. To explain the structures, table 4.5 on
page 100 highlights the tax burden for an incorporated business in Germany for
both tax systems, where the distribution, which can be directly derived from the
ITR dataset, is exogenously set to 100 in row 4 in table 4.5 on page 100. The
relevant income is given in row 1 with the business profit.
If an investor received 100 of dividends, the business profit, i.e. the economic in-
come, was 175.57. One pays local trade tax (29.26) and corporation tax at a rate
of 40% (plus solidarity surcharge) for retained earnings (61.74). When the profit is
distributed, the corporate tax rate is lowered to 30% and a relief of 15.44 is granted
in this case. The distribution (100) is subject to the personal income tax rate and
solidarity surcharge at a tax base of 146.31 that is equal to the business profit after
local trade tax. As the corporation tax is imputed at a rate of 30%, the individual
increases his consumable amount by 71.44, implying a CNTR of 59.31%. Apply-
ing the narrow focus, one neglects the presence of the local trade tax such that the
income is equal to the income tax base (146.31). The result of this narrow focus
22 The top 1% quantile received 42.85% of the dividend and interest income in 2001. The income
from dividends and interests represent the second largest income component for the top 0.1%
(0.01%) quantile with 21.22% (27.71%) of gross income. Cf. tables 4.10 and 4.11.
23 Consider that a corporation retains earnings. A narrow focus on the personal tax alone would
imply these earnings to be temporarily tax-free, while they are evidently reduced by the local
trade tax and the corporate tax.
24 The dividends taxable in 2001 were taxed in 95.9% of the cases under the full imputation system,
in 4.1% of the cases under the half income system. (Source: Income Tax Return (ITR) Data for
2001, own calculations).
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is a CNTR (here ETRBCS) of 51.17% which is well below the true tax burden on
profits from incorporated businesses.
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For profits that are taxed under the half income system, one pays local trade tax
(27.16) and corporation tax at a rate of 25% plus solidarity surcharge (35.82) on the
tax base (135.82) where the local trade tax is deductible as a business expense and
from its own tax base (162.99). The remainder (100) is distributed to owners imme-
diately where half of the distribution is subject to personal income tax and solidarity
surcharge (25.58). This procedure leaves owners with an after-tax increase in their
wealth of 74.42 which translates into a CNTR of 54.34%.
For the sake of our argument, let us assume that we only focus on the income tax
and adjust the observed income tax base of dividend recipients (row 4) by 4/3, as
in BCS, p. 9. On our adjusted gross income in row 1 we now slap the empirically
observed income tax and solidarity surcharge (25.58) and calculate an ETRBCS of
19.19% or 38.38%, depending on whether we adjust the distribution in row 4 (100)
– as demonstrated in column 3 – or the tax base (50), which is half the distribution,
as in column 4. Proceeding in this fashion, BCS underestimate the CNTR by over 8
percentage points for the full imputation system and by 35.15 or 15.97 percentage
points for the half income system, respectively, depending on the adjustment.
In a nutshell, BCS severely underestimate the CNTR of over half of the income
components for the top 0.1% quantile and over 94% for the 0.001% quantile. Fur-
thermore, the bias increases in 2002 as the share of dividends taxed under the half
income system will be higher than in 2001.
Tax Treatment of Losses
With regard to the tax treatment of losses, intertemporal and intra-temporal offset
measures must be distinguished. With regard to intra-temporal offsets, German tax
law restricted the amount of losses that could be offset between the seven income
types mentioned in § 2 of the German Income Tax Code to 51,500 e for single fil-
ers and 103,000 e for joint filers. Losses above this level were subject to a limited
offset. BCS25 mention this source of complications but any adjustment mechanism
remains undiscussed. The remaining losses should be factored into both the eco-
nomic income and the tax liability. While the income adjustment is rather straight-
forward, the determination of tax liability assigned to the examined year cannot be
conducted satisfactorily. One would need the present value of the tax liability re-
ductions due to the remaining losses from the year under examination accruing in
25 Cf. footnote 9.
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the future. Potentially, this assessment could stretch out into a very distant future if
taxable income for the offset is slow to come by or if the carry-forward is sizable.
The restrictions only affect 0.05% of the taxpayers with a positive income but it
should be noted that 0.55% of the top 1% quantile is affected with a mean of
3,374,415 e, showing that the flaw in the calculation is more severe for the rich.
Intertemporal offsets were limited to a carry-back to the previous year up to 511,500e
and unlimited carry-forwards. Bearing these legal rules in mind, the tax payments
attributable to a single period must be adjusted. BCS’ starting point for computing
the adjusted gross income in t, the overall amount of income (Gesamtbetrag der
Einkünfte), does not include the intertemporal offsets. However, their measure of
the assessed income tax liability in t, i.e. the nominator of ETRBCSt , is lowered
by the intertemporal loss deductions while the denominator – the AGI – remains
constant. The reduction of the assessed income tax liability and the nominator, re-
spectively, has to be attributed to the period when the loss occurred, i.e. to t + 1 or
t− x.
In a nutshell, the tax liability attributable to the examined period t is the assessed
income tax liability that would have been due without any intertemporal loss offsets
in t but – as argued above – lowered by the present value of tax liability reductions
from losses that occurred in t but could not be offset in that period.
The following example gives an idea of the degree to which the omission of losses
can bias the CNTR. Assume a (simplified) scenario with four single taxpayers
where each investor has an overall amount of income of 5,000,000 e in 2001. To
steer clear of the complications of taxes other than the income tax, assume that his
overall amount of income consists of wage income only. Investor 1 has neither loss
carry-back nor carry-forwards. Investor 2 suffers a loss of 1,000,000 e in 2002,
such that he can carry back 511,500 e to 2001. Investor 3 has a loss carry-forward
of 1,000,000 e which he fully offsets in 2001. Investor 4 features both a loss carry-
forward of 1,000,000 e and a loss of 1,000,000 e in 2002 that is carried back to
2001 to the tune of 511,500 e. We now compute the assessed income tax liability
for each investor in 2001 (row 5) and the tax payment assigned to 2001 (row 6).
By dividing row 5 by the income in 2001, one arrives at ETRBCS . Row 8 deliv-
ers the comprehensive nominal tax rate including the tax payment assigned to 2001
(CNTR2001).
While each investor receives the same income in 2001,ETRBCS varies from 35.28%
to 50.75% while the CNTR2001 is actually 50.75% for all four investors. If one
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TABLE 4.6: The Effect of Intertemporal Offsets on the ETR
Investor 1 2 3 4
(1) Income in 2001 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
(2) Carryback – 511,500 – 511,500
(3) Carryforward – – 1,000,000 1,000,000
(4) Taxable Income 5,000,000 4,488,500 4,000,000 3,488,500
(5)
Assessed Income
Tax Liability1 2,537,359 2,275,638 2,025,684 1,763,963
(6)
Tax Payment
assigned to 20011 2,537,359 2,537,359 2,537,359 2,537,359
(7)=(5)/(1) ETRBCS 50.75% 45.51% 40.51% 35.28%
(8)=(6)/(1) CNTR2001 50.75% 50.75% 50.75% 50.75%
1Solidarity Surcharge contained in income tax payment
raised the loss carryforward for investor 4, ETRBCS would drop further. The in-
tertemporal loss offset lowers the assessed income tax liability while the income of
2001 is not touched upon. But the reduction of the income tax liability cannot be as-
signed to 2001 since the losses and the tax reduction must be assigned to the period
when the loss occurred. What this paragraph shows is that it is virtually impossible
to disentangle taxpayers’ tax affairs and focus on a single year to assess the cut that
taxation takes out of their income.
With regard to the importance of this issue, the intertemporal loss offset affects
1.38% of all taxpayers, this proportion rises to 9.38% (13.12% /13.31%) for the top
0.1% (0.01% /0.001%) quantile with a mean of 1,200,810e (3,630,884e/9,019,291e)26,
implying that the underestimation bias is not uniformly distributed among the tax-
payers. It rather serves to reinforce the impression that the rich are not paying taxes.
Income from renting and leasing
A hazy subject in BCS is the treatment of income from renting and leasing. Ac-
cording to BCS, “losses from renting and leasing exceeding some thresholds (are
disregarded) since most of these losses are likely to arise from tax avoidance.”27
Even disregarding the status of the term “tax avoidance” (which is customarily used
to denote perfectly legal minimization strategies of one’s tax liability, as opposed to
26 Cf. table 4.12.
27 BCS, p. 23. The threshold is set equal to 2,500 e / 5,000 e.
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criminal “tax evasion”), and the reasoning provided, the asymmetric truncation of
losses from renting and leasing strikes one as arbitrary.
BCS dwell on this income type extensively and suspect major loopholes for the
rich there. According to the calculations by Müller (2004, p. 77), income from
renting and leasing plays a minor, yet special role in that aggregate income tax
revenue from this income type has been consistently negative over the years. With
regard to losses from this income type, Müller (2004, p. 93) goes on to argue that
these are concentrated in the upper quantiles of the German income distribution.
Our analyses show28 that 18.05% of all taxpayers report earnings from renting and
leasing. Among these taxpayers, 52.01% report losses. This explains the negative
share of -0.14% of the income from renting and leasing in the overall amount of
income. It has to be noted, though, that 1,652,865 taxpayers (32,48% of the reported
cases) report losses exceeding 5,000 e such that the truncation envisioned by BCS
becomes relevant. The effects of this – arbitrary – threshold of 5,000 e on the
calculations in BCS are easily explained: the truncation cuts off the lower tail of
the distribution of income from rent and leasing, which – artificially – increases
the mean income from this income type from -687 e to 4.604 e. Müller (2004,
p. 92, Fig. 2.2) draws attention to the extremely uneven distribution of losses from
renting and leasing for the years 1989, 1992 and 1995. The 90 % of taxpayers with
the lowest overall amount of income in the respective year declared less than 60 %
of the entire amount of losses accrued in this income type, while the remaining right
tail of the income distribution declared the missing 40 odd %.
Apart from the arbitrary truncation of losses (which we undo in our calculations in
subsection 4.3.2), several problems aggravate the calculations envisioned by BCS.
Firstly, it should be borne in mind that real estate management can also be con-
ducted in an unincorporated or incorporated business, making any truncation im-
possible. Furthermore, any gains or losses from the divestment of real estate would
be subject to corporate and personal taxation. Secondly, the data only record the
current returns and deductions, but exclude any gains or losses realized upon sale
of the real estate itself in the income from renting and leasing. These would show
up in the income type “other income” only if the sale took place within the spec-
ulation period29. Since an investor includes both the returns from renting and the
resale price in his calculus, it is impossible to separate the income from renting
28 Cf. table 4.10.
29 Cf. our example in table 4.2.
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and leasing and the attendant gains and losses from sale. The datasets available for
Germany do not allow one to make this connection, though.
With regard to the returns to renting and leasing, the state of the German real estate
market is not easily ascertainable. As is true of any real estate market, transactions
are infrequent and the terms of these transactions are rarely released. Recent years
have witnessed the first concerted efforts toward the compilation of a price index
for real estate in Germany. Hoffmann and Lorenz (2006, p. 30-36) report several
indicators of price developments for German real estate. While the multitude of
indicators reported there do not give a consistent picture, they certainly refute the
notion that outsized gains could be realized in German real estate in the last two
decades. Indeed, government had to stimulate real estate investments in East Ger-
many to entice investors at the beginning of the 1990s, where faster depreciation for
tax purposes was one of the main instruments. As the diagrams in Hoffmann and
Lorenz (2006, p. 33) show, prices for East German real estate declined precipitously
during the period 1995 to 2005. Given that large-scale pre-tax gains obviously did
not materialise, the claim that income from renting and leasing has been a “a vast
loophole for tax-saving activities in Germany for decades, especially in the 1990s30”
rings hollow31.
So far, we can conclude that not only the measure of effective taxation itself is
disputable but also the definition of the income does not strictly follow any of the
three concepts presented in section 4.2.3. As BCS also omitted the local trade tax,
the corporate tax, the intertemporal effects of loss deduction in their computation
and regarded economic losses from renting and leasing as “tax avoidance”, the nu-
merator – the taxes paid – as well as the denominator – the income – are strongly
biased. Furthermore, the quotient of these (biased) numbers cannot be interpreted
as a measurement of effective taxation, at the utmost as a nominal tax burden in one
year.
4.3 Analysis of Effective Tax Rates on Top Incomes
4.3.1 Description of Available Datasets
BCS describe the components of their dataset and their matching procedure quite
30 Emphasis added by the authors.
31 We report empirical results for gains/losses from real estate transactions in table 4.13.
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extensively in their chapter 3. The dataset used in BCS is a sample composed
of matched information from the SOEP and the FAST 1992-2001: To overcome
deficiencies in each of the two datasets, BCS lump them together to form their
“integrated ITR-SOEP data set”. The matching algorithm employed is described in
Bach et al. (2007, Appendix 2).
Their first component, the FAST32 is comprehensively described in Merz, Vor-
grimmler and Zwick (2006). It is a scientific use file that is collected every three
years and contains a 10 % random sample of tax returns filed in the respective year,
resulting in approximately 3,000,000 cases out of a population of approximately
30,000,000 tax returns. So far – as of the time of writing – the data for the years
1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 have been made available. As a stratified sample, this
file contains very precise information for certain minority groups of the population
whose data are consequently anonymised more strongly. In particular, the right tail
of the income distribution is entirely present in the dataset. Overall, more than 600
variables are contained in the dataset.
The time structure suggested by the triennial compilation process for the FAST does
not imply a panel structure, though. Crucially for the analysis in BCS and ours, the
concatenation of the four yearly files does not allow one to track taxpayers across
time. As an anonymised and randomised file, information cannot be linked across
years. Assessments of tax burdens are thus only possible for a given individual
taxpayer and year.
As an additional crucial hurdle, German Income tax law stipulates the taxation of
accounting profits for certain income types, i.e. income from forestry and agri-
culture, income from business activity and self-employment. The process of the
determination of taxable profit is not observable in the data whereas the resulting
balance is reported. This contrasts with the other income types where the determi-
nation of their contribution to the tax base is observable in much greater depth. As
a corollary, the presence or absence of accruals within the reported profits cannot
be determined. Any attempt to undo their effects is thus doomed.
Regarding the second major data source for BCS, comprehensive information on
the German Socio-Economic Panel, SOEP, compiled by the DIW, Berlin, can be
found in Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 16): “The SOEP was started in 1984
32 Abbreviation of the German “Faktische Anonymisierung der Steuerstatistik” – De Facto
Anonymisation of the Tax Statistics.
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as a longitudinal survey of private households and persons in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The central aim of this panel study is to collect representative micro-
data on persons, households and families...”. It is designed as a yearly sample of the
same units (households and individuals) and thus does allow inference with panel
methods. Compared with the FAST samples, the size of the dataset is more modest,
varying between 10,000 and 25,000 due to the addition of several new subsamples33.
On the other hand, the SOEP sample contains a broader cross-section of individuals
as it also contains taxpayers who are not legally obliged to file tax returns. With
regard to tax variables, it is quite apparent that the SOEP is not designed with the tax
researcher in mind and that the tax environment of the respondents must be inferred
in a rather piecemeal fashion and with a relatively high degree of uncertainty34.
Admittedly, a match with the SOEP could theoretically provide a tentative link
across years which might yield a panel structure. Yet the reasoning for the match-
ing provided in BCS, p. 6/7 does not mention the panel structure, but is explicitly
intended to more accurately reflect conditions in the lower tail of the income distri-
bution.
We tried to replicate this particular dataset as far as possible. Our contract with the
provider of the FAST sample did not allow us to match with another data source,
though. Consequently, we could not work on the same data. Given the high degree
of anonymisation in the right tail of the income distribution prevailing in the FAST
dataset, we ran a controlled data retrieval under the supervision of the statistical
office which gave us access to the entire population of almost 30,000,000 tax returns
(ITR) in Germany in 2001 and 900 variables for each of those35.
The deficiency of the missing matching is mitigated because we emphasize the con-
ditions in the right tail of the German income distribution. As this particular sub-
group, the “target group”, is completely represented in our dataset, we can make
inferences largely unperturbed by the missing cases for the left tail of the income
distribution. Given that our (and BCS’) main interest lies in the right tail, we can
omit the matching from our analysis36.
33 Cf. Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 26).
34 Cf. Wagenhals and Buck (2007) for a possible solution.
35 Data handling issues forced us to drop taxpayers with a reported overall amount of income around
0 e. This induced a drop in the sample size to approximately 28,150,000.
36 In any case, the link thus established would be too flimsy as the small number of 25,000 units in
the SOEP has to be matched to the approximately 3,000,000/30,000,000 units in the FAST/ITR.
On average, each SOEP unit must account for well over 100/1,000 units in the FAST/ITR
database.
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4.3.2 “Adjusted Gross Income” Variable in BCS
BCS devote their section 4 and appendix 2 to the derivation of an “adjusted gross
income”. We argue above37 that any attempt to measure the economic profit from
the data available to researchers is severely restricted. Bearing the limitations in
mind, we provide our digest for the derivation of an economically based single-
period income. Table 4.7 displays our adjustments compared to the adjustments by
BCS, grouped by the seven income types recognized under German income tax law.
We highlight major deviations from the methodology in BCS in bold face.
TABLE 4.7: Definition of Adjusted Gross Income
Income
from
Adjustments made by BCS Necessary adjustments of the
taxable income
Wages
• Adjustment for employers’
social security contributions
• Allowable expenses excluded
• Social security contributions for
civil servants imputed
• Tax exempt foreign wage
income added
• Adjustment for employers’
social security contributions
• Allowable expenses included
• Social security contributions for
civil servants imputed
• Tax exempt foreign wage
income added
37 Cf. section 4.2.4 on page 93.
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Income
from




• Includes income from




• Tax exempt profits from
outbound business activities
included
• Tax subsidies added
• Income should be adjusted for
“tax expenditures" such as
depreciation, but data is not
available
• Includes income from




• Tax exempt profits from
outbound business activities
included
• Tax subsidies added
• Since these “tax expenditures"
are “capital expenditures", an
adjustment cannot be justified




• Includes gains from disposal of
enterprises or substantial
shareholdings (Income from
business activity) and of private
investments (Speculation gains
§ 23)
• Includes gains from disposal of
enterprises or substantial
shareholdings (Income from
business activity) and of private
investments (Speculation gains
§ 23)
• “Tax-Free” capital gains are
added, as far as reported
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Income
from





• Saver Allowance added to
income
• Recorded net dividend is
multiplied by 4
3
• Saver Allowance added to
income
• Recorded net dividend under
half income system is adjusted
by corporate tax and by the
local trade tax
• Dividends under full imputation





• Losses exceeding 5,000 e are
ignored
• Losses from shareholdings of
closed property funds, etc.
exceeding 2,500 e are ignored




• Corrected for the allowance for
taxable pensions from
employment
• Non-taxable share of life
annuity funds is added to
income (70% of the pension)
• Social assistance, housing
benefits and other public
transfers are taken from the
SOEP
• Corrected for the allowance for
taxable pensions from
employment
• Non-taxable share of life
annuity funds is not added to
income
• Social assistance, housing
benefits and other public
transfers are ignored since top
1% are unlikely to receive
public transfer income
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Income
from
Adjustments made by BCS Necessary adjustments of the
taxable income
Losses
• Remaining non-deducted losses
occurred in 2001 should be
subtracted.
We include the deductible expenses for income from wages, i.e. we do not add
these expenses to the adjusted gross income since for example the costs for training
or education dilute the taxpayer’s economic income while also being recognized as
tax deductible. Adding these costs would lead to an overestimation of the adjusted
gross income and, consequently, to an underestimation of the nominal tax burden.
BCS describe a category “business activity” that bundles the profit income types
recognized under German income tax law. Firstly, a line must be drawn between
the income from unincorporated businesses and income from self-employment: The
local trade tax burden is added to the taxable income as shown in table 4.4 for un-
incorporated business, while the self-employed are not subject to this tax. As BCS
omit the local trade tax entirely, this problem does not crop up in their contribution.
Secondly, any – putative – adjustments for “tax expenditures” cannot be justified.
BCS term the provisions for pension reserves or depreciation charges “tax expen-
ditures”, without properly explaining the implications of this classification. From
circumstantial evidence, it seems that any “accruals”, i.e. charges that do not coin-
cide with the associated cash flow, are regarded as “in need of correction”. Adding
these components to the taxable income would imply a fundamental flaw since the
tax expenditures either have already been capital expenditures – as in the case of
depreciation allowances – or will be wage expenditures in the future – in the case of
pension reserves. As mentioned in subsection 4.3.1, the profit- and loss statements
of the tax balance sheets underlying the income from unincorporated businesses is
not available. Thus, the ability to correct for supposed “loopholes” is restricted by
data availability.
The capital gains from the sale of an enterprise or a substantial shareholding – even
if they are tax-exempted – are added to the speculation gains to form the income
from capital gains. The gains realized from the disposal outside the speculative
period are not included in the taxable income effectuating an underestimation of
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the adjusted gross income from capital gains. These gains must be added to the
adjusted gross income but unfortunately they are not observable38. It has to be noted
that the “tax-free” capital gains are far away from being tax-free. Many studies
proved that corporate and dividend taxes reduce the valuation of shares. Thus, the so
called “tax-free” capital gains are already taxed at the corporate and the shareholder
level39.
The income from interest and dividends represents another major source of er-
ror in the BCS approach. Firstly, the bundling of this income stream ties together
two heterogeneous sources of income, with dividends carrying a burden from the
corporate level while interest is unencumbered by any prior taxation. While BCS
multiply the recorded net dividend by the factor 1.333 in order to try to account for
the corporation tax under the half income system, they ignore the local trade tax as
shown in table 4.5 for both the half income system and the full imputation system.
Therefore, we adjust the taxable dividend by adding the local trade tax. Addition-
ally we add the corporation tax under the half income system. Consistent with BCS,
we add the saver allowance to the income.
For the reasons discussed in subsection 4.2.5, we do not adjust the income from
renting and leasing. The consistently negative income that renting and leasing has
delivered over the last decades indicates that investors suffered economic losses.
Furthermore, we do not go along with the practice in BCS of truncating losses for
this particular income type at a threshold of 5,000 e.
We do not match the ITR data and the SOEP datasets, hence in the case of transfer
income, we cannot account for social assistance, housing benefits or other public
transfers. This biases the income generally downwards but the effect for the top
incomes is negligible since they are not likely to receive any kind of transfer. In
contrast to BCS, we do not add the non-taxable share of life-annuity funds which
we regard as a payback of contributions made.
Finally, losses occurred in 2001 that could not have been offset against other (pos-
38 Since the “tax-free” speculation gains are neither reported in the ITR data nor in the SOEP, any
matching process does not help to uncover this flaw. With the introduction of the final withholding
tax in 2009, capital gains from the disposal of shares will be taxed with 25% regardless of the
holding period solving the information problem behind the “tax-free” capital gains.
But we assume the speculation gains to have minor impact on the income in 2001 and 2002,
since the substantial interest for tax purposes was lowered to 1% in 1999. Furthermore, the stock
market showed rather bad performance in 2001 where the TecDax crashed from over 9,500 points
in 2000 to a minimum 683.82 in 2001 and the DAX fell to its 1998 level.
39 See among others Ball (1984) and Collins and Kemsley (2000).
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itive) sources of income are not integrated in the overall amount of income and
thus, should be recognized in the computation of the economic income. However,
as the present value of tax liability reduction from the remaining losses is not ob-
servable, one cannot correctly account for the intertemporal effect of the restriction
to the intra-temporal loss offset. Therefore, we cannot adjust for these losses and
underestimate the “true” CNTR.
Bearing in mind that the “correct” and representative figure of income can only
be derived from any cross-sectional dataset under the restrictions discussed in sec-
tion 4.2.4, we conclude that our definition of income differs from the adjusted gross
income in BCS for every income type.
4.3.3 Adjustment for Taxes Paid
In addition to the adjustments enumerated in table 4.7, we also adjust the numer-
ator in equation (4.2) and account for the most important taxes. We detail these
corrections in table 4.8 which itself mirrors table 4.7.
TABLE 4.8: Adjustments to Recognized Tax Burden
Income
from
Necessary adjustments to Recognized Tax Burden
Wages • Accounted for possible taxes paid on foreign wages
Business
Activity
• Taxes paid abroad on tax exempted profits from outbound
business activities included




• Corporate tax and the local trade tax are added to the PIT
for the half income system
• Local trade tax added for the full imputation system
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Income
from
Necessary adjustments to Recognized Tax Burden
Losses
• Loss carry-forwards used in 2001 and carry-backs from
2002 lower recorded tax burden in 2001. Difference in
income tax burden with and without carryforward and
carryback is added.
• Present value of tax reduction from non-deducted losses
occurred in 2001 should lower tax liability.
The adjustment of the recognized tax burden follows a simple rule. If you increase
the taxable income for any income type in order to derive economic income, you
have to account for possible taxes paid on the respective levels. For example, BCS
adjust for tax exempted foreign wages income. If these wages carry a tax burden
from abroad then these taxes must be added to the PIT. The same problem results for
tax exempted profits from outbound business activities with a potential accumulated
tax burden. For the correct adjustment, information on the country of origin, the tax
rate and the tax base would be necessary.
For the case of capital gains, the problem of inferring the accumulated tax burden
proves insurmountable. It is neither observable nor measurable with any method as
one would have to compare the pre-tax capital gain with the (observable) after-tax
capital gain. However, several studies prove that capital gains carry a tax burden, as
discussed in the last section.
By contrast, the local trade tax (τLTT ) and the corporate tax (τCorp) paid on the
corporate level can be derived from the information available from the ITR dataset.
If an incorporated business paid out one Euro of dividends under the half income
system, resp. full imputation system, then the profit on the corporate level was
1
(1−τCorp)(1−τLTT ) , resp.
1
1−τLTT . Since we adjusted the gross income, we have to
adjust the recognized tax burden by the corporate tax and the local trade tax as
well. The accumulated tax burden from dividend income on the corporate level
(ATBDiv), which is added to the PIT and which is defined as the difference between
the pre-corporate-tax profit and the pre-income-tax gross dividend, evolves under
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the half income system as
ATBDiv =
(
τCorp + τLTT − τCorp · τLTT
) Div
(1− τCorp)(1− τLTT )
(4.6)





Additionally, the local trade tax must be added to the recognized tax burden if a
taxpayer has income from an unincorporated business. We can observe the lump-
sum offset of the local trade tax (Steuerermäßigung bei Einkünften aus Gewer-
bebetrieb) from § 35 denoted as O§35. Thus, we derive the taxable business in-
come (Gewerbesteuer-Messbetrag) by dividing the offset by 1.8. The accumu-
lated tax burden of the income from an unincorporated income ATBUninc evolves






Losses carried forward to 2001 from prior years and/or losses carried back from
2002 into 2001 impact the tax liability due in 2001 yet leave the adjusted gross
income untouched. A recognition of the tax reduction solely in 2001 would un-
duly bias the resulting tax rates downward. For the reasons expounded in sub-
section 4.2.5, we account for this effect in the manner described at the bottom of
table 4.8. The present value of the tax liability reduction from non-deducted losses
occurred in 2001 should, but cannot be recognized for the reasons discussed in sub-
section 4.3.2.
Since taxable capital gains from the disposal of enterprises and substantial share-
holdings, business activity and dividends represent the major part of the income
of the rich and the super-rich, BCS’ measure of “effective taxation” provides an
incorrect, downward biased picture of the “tax burden” of the rich.
40 The index i indicates that we account for regional differences in the collection rate in 2001. The
federal state of the taxpayer is known from the dataset which allows us to apply the average
collection rate for the individual federal state.
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4.3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we provide our results for the cross-section of income tax returns
in Germany in 2001. Table 4.9 shows the mean comprehensive nominal tax rates
emanating from our adjustments, conditional on the quantiles of the income distri-
bution, and the corresponding numbers from BCS, table 4. The last column gives
the difference in percentage points between the two sets of results. Note that the
adjustments in our approach and in BCS differ in the manner described in table 4.7
so that the allocation to quantiles may not coincide perfectly.
TABLE 4.9: Comparison of the Comprehensive Nominal Tax Rate and ETRBCS
for 2001
Quantile CNTR ETRBCS ∆=CNTR–ETRBCS
Decile 1-5 3.60% 2.90% 0.70%
Decile 6-9 12.87% 10.10% 2.77%
Decile 10 23.27% 21.90% 1.37%
Top 1% 37.21% 33.40% 3.81%
Top 0.1% 45.25% 38.20% 7.05%
Top 0.01% 48.05% 38.70% 9.35%
Top 0.001% 50.30% 38.10% 12.20%
Top 0.0001% 51.39% 36.00% 15.39%
Source: ITR 2001, own calculations
Apparently, there is a broad agreement between the results. Within the top 1% quan-
tile, the results diverge markedly, with the differences ranging from 3.81 percentage
points for the 1% quantile to 15.39 percentage points for the top 0.0001% quantile.
Given the focus on the taxation of “the rich” in BCS, this development acquires a
lot of significance. As an explanation for the differences, we provide table 4.10
on page 120 which clearly shows the change in composition in the adjusted sum of
income between the quantiles.
Taxpayers below the 90% quantile rely heavily on domestic wage income (84.54%
for the deciles 1-5 and 91.81% for the deciles 6-9 respectively) which is taxed in
a cash flow manner, i.e. in an uncontroversial way which requires very few ad-
justments. Within the upper 1% quantile, though, the importance of wage income
declines precipitously from 44.22% for the top 1% quantile to 0.27% for the top
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0.0001% while business and capital income assume greater weight. Taxpayers in
the top 0.001% (0.0001%) quantile generate 94.24% (99.99%) of their income from
capital or business income. These are the income types where our criticism of the
BCS approach bites most heavily and where consequently the divergence is great-
est.
These results cast grave doubt on the validity of the claim in BCS, p. 17 that “...av-
erage effective tax rates paid by the economic elite...” was 38.1% in 2001. The
economic elite – defined in BCS as the upper 0.001% quantile – actually faced a
CNTR of 50.30% which is over 12 percentage points higher. Bearing all the caveats
of our prior analysis in mind, the CNTRs exceed the top statutory income tax rates
by several percentage points across the board, highlighting the influence of the lo-
cal trade tax and the corporation tax on the overall tax burden. On top of that, the
relevance of intertemporal loss deductions, depicted in table 4.12 on page 122, in-
creases with the quantiles, so that the bias arising from the omission of the losses in
BCS also increases.
4.3.5 Limitations
Concerning the methodology used, we describe additional41 limitations in this sec-
tion. As mentioned above, our main interest lies in the right tail of the income
distribution. Note here that we must contend with the fact that the dataset only
contains information pertaining to taxation. The definition of “income rich” should
thus be read as “taxable income rich”, subject to the modifications that we describe
in table 4.7. Assume, in the fashion of table 4.1 on page 91, a taxpayer who makes
spectacular gains in real estate and shares after the expiration of the speculation pe-
riod of 10, resp. 1 year: if you further assume that this is his major source of income,
he could make millions without the ITR dataset even noticing him. The particular
definition of income dictated by German income tax law would effectively allow
him to “fly below the radar”. Similarly, if a taxpayer’s assets consisted of a share in
an incorporated business and the business retained its entire earnings for 2001, the
taxpayer would be classified as “poor” in the 2001 cross-section because he does
not have taxable income42 in this year. Note how differently this issue would be
41 Note that the main criticism of the BCS approach is contained in section 4.2.
42 This is true for the purposes of income taxation. Corporation tax is due on the profit, anyway.
There is no link, though, in the data that would enable us to establish a connection.
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handled under economic income: if the investments enabled by the retention were
profitable, an economic appreciation would be due, generating economic income
in the year 2001. Given the inevitable departures of a cross-sectional income def-
inition in the dataset from economic income stressed throughout our article, the
classification of taxpayers into quantiles based on the “overall amount of income”
(Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte) is certainly problematic. These problems are shared
with BCS and anyone who makes inferences from tax data.
4.4 Conclusion
We have provided a comprehensive examination of the most salient and contro-
versial results in Bach et al. (2008). Our argumentation rests on several layers of
critique:
Very fundamentally, we argue that a restriction on the income tax burden has low-
ered the “effective tax rates” calculated in BCS by up to 12 percentage points. We
replace it with a comprehensive measure of tax burden and calculate tax rates that
are well above the nominal tax rate. In particular, the omission of the local trade tax
and the corporation tax from the calculations is bound to yield a skewed picture of
the nominal tax burden. Given that income from business activity is concentrated in
the upper quantiles of the income distribution, this omission does not cause a down-
ward shift across all taxpayers, but an unambiguous bias toward lighter taxation of
the rich. We also find that the concept of effective tax rates is not applicable, as
the very notion of ETRs precludes their meaningful deployment in a single period
calculus. Furthermore, we have questioned the role of accruals for tax purposes. By
their very nature, these items must be interpreted in an intertemporal perspective,
as they are designed to transform cash flows into tax bases over time. We also find
substantial shortcomings with respect to the treatment of tax losses, as intertemporal
aspects reassert themselves.
Reassuringly, the official tax statistics (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2001, p. 21)
for 2001 provide a glimpse at the massive contribution that the income rich make
toward income tax receipts: while the upper 50 % of German income taxpayers
contributed over 90 % of income tax receipts in 2001, the upper ten percent con-
tribute over 50 % and the upper five percent, the smallest quantile for which these
numbers are available for 2001, chips in 40 odd %.
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We have shown that the complaint in BCS, p. 20: “... effective tax progression
stops at income levels within the top percentile, i.e. the effective tax rate is not
monotonically increasing in gross income within the top percentile of the income
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TABLE 4.12: Relevance of Intertemporal Loss Deductions
RL §21 Intertemporal LD2 Total3
Quantiles Total Mean (e) CB CF
Losses 99.51% 0.09% 19,894.51 0.00% 0.09% 99.51%
Decile 1–5 0.04% 1.90% 10,809.46 0.22% 1.69% 4.01%
Decile 6–9 0.03% 0.71% 37,038.94 0.18% 0.53% 0.74%
Decile 10 0.16% 1.57% 187,327.72 0.44% 1.16% 1.06%
1% 0.55% 4.83% 415,176.84 1.34% 3.65% 5.23%
0.1% 0.71% 9.38% 1,200,816.34 2.84% 7.03% 9.86%
0.01% 0.72% 13.12% 3,630,884.23 4.02% 9.97% 13.66%
0.001% 0.00% 13.31% 9,019,291.05 3.60% 11.15% 13.67%
0.0001% 0.00% 22.22% 9,092,094.67 3.70% 18.52% 22.22%
Total 1.09% 1.38% 36,062,25 0.23% 1.16% 2.46%
1 Percentage of taxpayers with remaining non-deducted intratemporal losses of 2001 (§ 2 German Tax
Code) – 2 Percentage of taxpayers with intertemporal loss deductions in 2001. Total percentage and
proportion of carrybacks from 2002 (CB) and all carryforwards from prior years reported –
3 Cumulates the cases, where the CNTR is biased either due to a remaining non-deducted intratemporal
loss or an intertemporal loss offset as percentage of all taxpayers.
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TABLE 4.13: Reporting Frequency of Income Components
Income from:
Quantiles §131 §152 §183 §194 §205 §216 §22/237
Losses 3.97% 58.18% 11.10% 28.09% 12.42% 41.47% 17.68%
Decile 1–5 1.87% 12.49% 3.46% 82.09% 9.40% 12.73% 21.51%
Decile 6–9 2.27% 12.71% 5.39% 94.82% 9.46% 18.84% 8.38%
Decile 10 2.13% 25.28% 20.21% 89.32% 26.59% 42.11% 7.80%
Top 1% 2.80% 53.36% 38.96% 75.15% 65.09% 72.57% 15.79%
Top 0.1% 4.27% 75.45% 32.63% 69.62% 89.07% 82.65% 23.50%
Top 0.01% 6.99% 89.46% 32.52% 63.32% 94.69% 86.05% 27.50%
Top
0.001%
10.07% 94.96% 46.40% 58.99% 95.32% 87.05% 35.97%
Top
0.0001%
14.81% 96.30% 62.96% 62.96% 96.30% 85.19% 33.33%
Total 2.05% 13.84% 5.88% 87.84% 19.62% 18.05% 14.96%
Thereof Reported Losses
Losses 62.15% 93.38% 77.90% 36.01% 12.17% 85.28% 0.62%
Decile 1–5 12.66% 30.41% 17.25% 0.36% 2.56% 43.03% 0.08%
Decile 6–9 9.65% 25.58% 14.79% 0.02% 5.17% 55.49% 0.42%
Decile 10 13.87% 27.27% 8.97% 0.05% 6.19% 59.65% 2.42%
Top 1% 24.06% 29.63% 5.59% 0.15% 4.54% 58.27% 0.00%
Top 0.1% 39.08% 22.20% 7.60% 0.21% 2.40% 52.08% 2.09%
Top 0.01% 56.92% 13.07% 8.38% 0.17% 2.01% 48.38% 1.96%
Top
0.001%
64.29% 11.36% 3.10% 0.00% 1.51% 46.69% 4.00%
Top
0.0001%
75.00% 7.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 60.87% 22.22%
Total 11.47% 28.09% 13.54% 0.18% 2.44% 52.01% 0.28%
Source: ITR 2001, own calculations.
1 Income from Agriculture and Forestry – 2 Income from Unincorporated Business – 3 Income from Self- Employment –




In this doctoral thesis, I have provided three contributions to the taxation of labor
income. Bearing in mind the fact that this is a relatively new and – so far – “fringe”
subject in tax research in Business Administration, these contributions constitute
an innovative new branch of investigation that should be pursued more vigorously.
Given the massive concentration of theoretical research in this area in the hands of
economists, this thesis is focused on empirical research. Adding new theoretical
insights will be a steep uphill struggle, though. The perceived skills of the Business
Administration profession in the area of accounting do note bite here, since labor
taxation is conducted along the lines of cash-flows. All accounting knowledge that
can be brought to bear for research into capital income issues becomes obsolete,
and the complexity of microeconomic modeling creeps in.
The subject of labor taxation does promise to feed future generations of researchers,
though. The tension between household production and participation in the official
labor market, i.e. between taxed and untaxed deployment of human capital, rep-
resents one underresearched aspect. Ferri, Molto and Uriel (2009), for instance,
have recently investigated the trade-off between home produced meals and those
served in restaurants for Spain, albeit with a reference to the value-added tax, not
the income tax that was researched in this doctoral thesis. Given that this strand
of literature has been around since at least Becker (1965) and Boskin (1975), there
should be pent-up demand for a greater emphasis on this gigantic tax base effect
(Freeman and Schettkat, 2005; Booth and Coles, 2010).
Another vast but relatively unexplored area is tackled by Jacobs and van Wijnbergen
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(2007), who explore an intriguing new avenue for research: Most students finance
their studies using debt, be it in the form of state support or from private sources.
The fact that the market for student financial support is dominated by debt positions
is unusual when compared to firm behavior where both equity and debt positions are
regularly sold. This restriction is forced upon workers by legal constraints, though:
The prohibition of slavery sees to it that workers cannot commit to pay a residual
claim on their wages to an equity holder. In contrast to the worker‘s inability to sell
equity in his human capital, labor taxation can perform this function and thus com-
plete the capital market for human capital. Indeed, by taxing the cash-flow flowing
to the worker after deductions for costs, taxation does claim the residual of human
capital payoffs that financiers cannot legally appropriate. This strand of literature
is currently emerging and has spawned contributions from Vandenberghe and De-
bande (2008), Cigno and Luporini (2009) and Del Rey and Racionero (2010).
I sincerely hope that my contributions have alerted the research community to the
promises that labor taxation holds for them.
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